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Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of
New York Times v. Sullivan:
Applying the Times for All Seasons
Joseph H. King, Jr l
"Itis lack of orderwhich makes us slaves; the confusion
of today discounts the freedom of tomorrow.
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NEw YORK TimEs v. SuLLvAN-THE GODHEAD

According to popular scientific lore and the second law of thermodynamics,
the idea of entropy contemplates that it is in the nature of things in isolated
systems to move from order to disorder.3 The Supreme Court's landmark
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan4 has been followed by doctrinal disorder that has taken hold in subsequent cases addressing First Amendment
limitations on state defamation law. The law in the evolving years has become a reification of entropy, and that lack of order can make us slaves. The
disorder and uncertainty in the post-New York Times constitutional jurisprudence undermine the doctrines created to enhance freedom of expression.
They thereby inhibit the very freedom that inspired the creation of those
doctrines by deterring and demoralizing free expression. This disorder and
uncertainty enslaves us by isolating and cutting us off from free communication, enslaving us all the same.
New York Times evokes a theatrical technique from Greek drama, which
the Romans described by the phrase, "Deus ex machina."5 It is literally translated as "a god from a machine."6 During plays, a statue of a deity was
3 See R. Nave, Entropy as Time'sArrow,http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/therml
entrop.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2oo6). Entropy is loosely described as follows:
One of the ideas involved in the concept of entropy is that nature
It is a part of our
tends from order to disorder in isolated systems ....
common experience. Spend hours cleaning your desk, your basement,
your attic, and it seems to spontaneously revert back to disorder and
chaos before your eyes.
Some care must be taken about how you define "disorder" if you are
going to use it to understand entropy. A more precise way to characterize
entropy is to say that it is a measure of the "multiplicity" associated with
the state of the objects.
Id. Science essayist, K.C. Cole, comments:
Disorder, alas, is the natural order of things in the universe....
Unlike almost every other physical property ... , entropy does not work
both ways. Once it's created it can never be destroyed. The road to
disorder is a one-way street.

Entropy wins not because order is impossible but because there are
always so many more paths toward disorder than toward order.
K. C. Cole, Hers, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1982, at C2.
4

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

5 See NEW OXFORD AMERMAN DIcTIONARY 467 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds.,
200 1) [hereinafter NEW OXFORD].
6 ELIZABETH WEBBER & MIKE FEINSILBER, DICTIONARY OF ALLUSIONS 148 (1999). Others
translate the phrase as "god from the machinery." NEW OXFORD, supra note 5, at 467. The
phrase is a translation from the Greek theos ek m7khane-s. Id.
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suspended above the stage.7 Then, at a crucial juncture, the god-statue
was suddenly introduced, lowered by a crude mechanism, the "machine,"
down onto the stage. Once there, it would resolve the otherwise insoluble
entangjements that had enveloped the players during the drama.' The
phrase has come to represent an attempt to use some artificial or improbable device to resolve a difficult quandary.' The New York Times case was
like a deity statue lowered onto the stage to resolve the threat then facing the press and critics of government and government officials. Both
New York Times and the mechanical deity appear marvelous on stage at first
sight. But, the reality is a different story.
Shortly after the New York Times decision, Professor Harry Kalven wondered whether it represented no more than "one pocket of cases" 1 or the
beginning of a "dialectic progression."" It seems now to have clearly been
the latter. The case has produced a profligacy of conceptual sequalae beset
with doctrinal complexity and uncertainty. The promise of New York Times
has faltered almost from the beginning as the Court fitfully and lurchingly
sought to define the reach and scope of its newly minted First Amendment
limitations on state defamation law."2 In retrospect, it was easy to understand why the Court moved aggressively to stem the litigious threat to freedom of expression at such a crucial time in America's collective awakening
to the scourge of racial injustice. As John Goldberg commented, "[i]n these
respects, Sullivan was about as easy to resolve as a landmark decision could
be." ' 3 But then there was the reality that "easy cases are not easy in all re-

7

See WEBBER
8 See id.

& FEINSILBER,supra

note 6, at 148.

OXFORD, supra note 5, at 467.
io Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case.-A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221. Kalven commented:

9 See NEW

It is not easy to predict what the Court will see in the Times opinion as
the years roll by. It may regard the opinion as covering simply one pocket
of cases, those dealing with libel of public officials, and not destructive
of the earlier notions that are inconsistent only with the larger reading
of the Court's action. But the invitation to follow a dialectic progression
from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in
the public domain, like art, seems to me to be overwhelming.
Id.
I Id.
12 See generally Don Lewis, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, andSpeech on Matters of PublicConcern: NewrDirections
in FirstAmendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REv. 767, 767 (1987) (commenting that since
Times, decisions have been "marked by a continual process of redefinition of the scope and
strength of the 'constitutional privilege to defame').
13 John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White's
DefamationJurisprudence,74 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2003).
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spects." 4 He explains that "because their outcomes are over-determined,
they pose the problem of how to decide subsequent cases, in which all
signs are not pointing toward one resolution ... [and] require the Court to
isolate the controlling principles underlying the initial decision."'"
The promise of New York Times-that of assuring a legal climate free
of the fear of liability imposed for expressions made without awareness
of their falsity or a conscious indifference to their truth or falsity-has not
been fully realized. New York Times planted the seeds of a constitutional
garden from which ever-growing layers of doctrinal and decision-making
complexity have sprouted.
The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan arrived at a
flexion point in American history. It was a time of social upheaval and the
stirrings of a national transformation in the collective American consciousness of racial injustice. As Justice Brennan noted, writing for the majority,
the defendant's publication was an "expression of grievance and protest on
one of the major public issues of our time."' 16 New York Times came during
"the perfect storm."' 7 Anthony Lewis eloquently described the setting:
To appreciate how great an impact the case had on American law and American society, we have to take ourselves back to the year when the libel action
started, 1960. We have to understand two things about that time: what the
state of race relations was, and what limits the United States Constitution
put on libel judgments. The events of 1960 came six years after the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Boardof Education, had held racial segregation to
be unlawful in public education. Yet, in that year not a single black child
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1477-78.
16 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
17 Goldberg, supra note 13, at 1476. Goldberg explains:
Everything about it had signaled the propriety of Supreme Court
intervention. The underlying litigation was brought at the height of
regional strife over the civil rights movement. Indeed, the suit was part
of a conscious effort by Alabama officials to deflect national scrutiny of
the Southern states and to derail federal efforts to desegregate. The
decisions of the state trial judge stretched jurisdictional and defamation
rules to their breaking points, demonstrating that he was himself an
active participant in this act of political resistance. The jury's $5oo,ooo
damage award, rendered without evidence of actual reputational
damage, was grossly excessive ....

In sum, what was nominally a

private-law defamation suit filed by Sullivan on his own behalf was a
thinly-veiled effort by which state and local governmental officials
sought to suppress criticism of their policies. It is no wonder, then, that
the Supreme Court reached out for the case and held, contrary to its
own prior statements, that the law of defamation can, at least in some
instances, unconstitutionally encroach on protected speech.

Id.at 1476-77 (footnotes omitted).
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attended a public school with white children in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, or South Carolina. The state universities remained segregated in those same states. Blacks were prevented from voting in large parts
of the Deep South by force or trick ....

Those were the realities that Martin Luther King, Jr. and his colleagues
were trying to change, along with segregation in the rest of life, in hospitals
and cemeteries and department stores. Dr. King had an idea, an optimistic
one. He thought that most Americans, if confronted with the ugliness and
brutality of racism, would disapprove. It was true that most Americans at
that time were actually unfamiliar with the realities of racism. Dr. King
set out to confront them with those realities. The press, both print and
broadcast, had an essential part to play if Dr. King's optimistic strategy was
to work."

A free, unbowed press was essential to achieving the ends of the civil rights
movement through non-violent means, trusting in the power of education
in awakening the public conscience. The stark alternatives were either a
continuation of a horrendous status quo or turning to a less peaceful way
of kindling change in a forum more elemental than the press and voting
booth.

The New York Times case arose out of statements contained in a fullpage paid advertisement in the New York Times on behalf of several individ19
uals and groups whose purpose was to call attention to a "wave of terror"
0
against black citizens during the non-violent protests in the South. The
plaintiff, one of three elected commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that certain statements in the advertisement were inaccurate and

18 Anthony Lewis, The Sullivan Decision, I TENN. J. L. & PuB. POL'v 135, 136-37 (2004).

Professor Alexander Bickel described the mindset of much of the American public before the
widespread publicity and media airing relating to the riots and confrontations over school
segregation, and the subsequent awakening of the public consciousness:
Compulsory segregation like states' rights . .. is an abstraction
and, to a good many people, a neutral or sympathetic one. These
riots, which were brought instantly, dramatically and literally home to
the American people, showed what it means concretely. Here were
grown men and women furiously confronting their enemy: two, three,
a half dozen scrubbed, starched, scared and incredibly brave colored
children. The moral bankruptcy, the shame of the thing, was evident.
The effect, achieved on
played a most significant role ....
Television ...
an unprecedented number of people with unprecedented speed, must
have been something like what used to happen to individuals ... at the
sight of an actual slave auction ....
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 267 (1962).
19 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
20 See id. at 256.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 95

defamed him."' Defendants admitted that the advertisement contained
several statements that were not completely accurate, such as the number
of times Dr. King had been arrested (seven instead of four).22 According
to Alabama's defamation law, once the meaning of the words were found
tending to injure the person's reputation or bring him into public contempt
under Alabama substantive tort principles, defendants then had no defense
except to prove the truth of their assertions.2 3 A jury awarded sizeable dam24
ages to the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the state supreme court.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed on First Amendment grounds. 5 In so doing, the Court for the first time injected a constitutional analysis into the matrix for deciding defamation cases that were
creatures of state law and had otherwise been governed by state tort law.
The majority opinion was written by Justice William Brennan, whose genius for gentle persuasion allowed him to craft the needed majority for this
26
landmark decision.
The Court initially refuted three arguments by the plaintiff that the
libel case was outside of the constitutional reach of the Court. Specifically,
the Court held first that the state-action requirement needed to implicate
the First Amendment 7 is satisfied by a civil lawsuit based on state common-law rules.2 8 The threat of criminal prosecution under an Alabama
criminal libel statute, with a fine not exceeding $500 and a prison sentence
of six months, paled in comparison to the $500,000 award in the instant

21

See id.

See id. at 258-59. Alleged inaccuracies included the name of the song the students
protesters sang; the reasons students were expelled; the statement about starving students
by padlocking the dining hall, whereas the hall was actually never padlocked; the statement
about the police ringing the campus, whereas the police never actually ringed the campus
but were only deployed near it; and the number of King's arrests. See id. It also appeared that
the plaintiff had not been a commissioner when three of four arrests occurred, and had no
involvement in King's perjury indictment. See id. at 259. Moreover, facts pertaining to the
alleged assault of Dr. King were disputed. Id.
23 See id. at 267.
24 Id. at 256.
22

25

See id. at 279-80,

291.

26 See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULJVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT i 56
(1991) (referring to "Justice Brennan's achievement in building a majority on the Court [and]

... holding that majority together behind an opinion with distinctive literary and historical
qualities: an opinion so rich in its observations on freedom of expression and libel that on
repeated readings one keeps discovering new meanings.").
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... "). The First Amendment restrictions are made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 276-77.
28 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277 ("What a State may not constitutionally bring
about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.").
The Court reasoned that it is not the form of the state power but the fact of its exercise that
satisfies the state action doctrine. See id.at 265.
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case; thus the fear of a damages award in civil action may be markedly
more inhibiting than the threat of a criminal proceeding. 9 Secondly, the
Court found that the First Amendment was still applicable even though
the allegedly defamatory statement was in the form of a commercial paid
advertisement. 3° Third, the Court held that defamation is nonetheless subject to constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment, explaining that
there is no "talismanic" dispensation for libel that precludes3constitutional
scrutiny just because an expression is alleged to be libelous. '
Having swept aside the plaintiff's attempt to short-circuit any constitutional analysis of his defamation claim, the Court articulated its core holding:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
that it was false or with reckless disregard of
malice"-that is, knowledge
3
whether it was false or not.
In order to prevail, a plaintiff must prove both what state tort law requires,
and the state of mind requirement of the First Amendment. Thus, the holding quite clearly demonstrates that the protections of the First Amendment
are not limited to "true" statements.
Extending First Amendment protection beyond true statements was
driven by the recognition that some degree of abuse is "'inseparable from
the proper use of every thing."'' 33 The Court seemed to recognize that the
inchoate perception of unactualized truth makes some errors inevitable as
34
the truth develops from the early, imperfectly formed factual base. Ac'
cordingly, the Court afforded the necessary "breathing space "" with its
limitation on defamation. In other words, the Court acknowledged that
if the truth is to develop, it is imperative to grant the process essential
"breathing space" because reciprocally, "'[wihatever is added to the field of
libel is taken from the field of free debate."' 36 Finally, after elaborating on

29 Id. at 277-78. The Court also noted that in civil cases, there are less procedural
safeguards than in criminal proceedings. Id. Moreover, defamation liability poses the threat
of a succession of such claims. Id.
30 See id. at 265-66.
31 Id. at 269.
32 Id. at 279-80.
33 Id. at 271 (quoting Madison).
34 Id. ("erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected
if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to survive'
(citation omitted)).
35 Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962)).
36 Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 1z8 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
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the limitations on state defamation law,37 the Court, as if to underscore its
determination, resolved the underlying case on the merits, ordering judgment for the defendants, finding as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence of actual malice on the part of either the individual defendants or the Times. 3"
New York Times heralded a fateful change in American defamation law.
Although the law of defamation had traditionally been (and is still to a large
extent) a product of state law, the legal rules governing defamation have
derived from two sources since the New York Times case:
The rules mandated by the First Amendment have not ... totally supplanted state law. Rather, the duality of state and federal constitutional law is
more accurately viewed as a layered tapestry. State law has provided the
base fabric overlaid by First Amendment rules that tailor and configure it
to accommodate the competing interests of protecting personal reputations
and ensuring freedom of expression.
The law of defamation may be likened to a bicycle. Its primary purpose is
to transport victims along the path to a remedy for their damaged reputations. However, lest the machine travel too fast and endanger us all, various
components are designed to control its speed. These devices, like the hand
brakes on the bicycle, include the common law elemental prerequisites to
recovery as well as the privileges insulating or limiting claims for otherwise
actionable communications. They also include, like foot brakes, constitu39
tionally mandated devices to provide further control.

The majority opinion by Justice Brennan is celebrated as lifting the
torch of freedom of expression by rescuing it from the "chilling" 40 men-

37 The Court elaborated on its holding in several respects regarding defamation claims
by public officials. First, it held that the standard of proof requires that plaintiff show that
defendant had the requisite state of mind with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. Second,
the requisite state of mind must exist in those persons having actual responsibility for the
publication of the advertisement. Id. at 287. The Court stated that "[t]he mere presence of
the stories in the files does not, of course, establish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement
was false, since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought home
to the persons in the Times' organization having responsibility for the publication of the
advertisement." Id. Third, the Court hinted that at some point a state court's finding of falsity
may be so minor that such findings themselves may "raise constitutional problems." Id. at
289. And, finally, the Court held, in connection with the reference to the plaintiff element
in defamation law, that statements critical of the government may not constitutionally be
transmuted into criticism of the individual or deemed to refer to individual government

officials. See id. at

291-92.

38 Id. at 284-86.
39 Joseph H. King, Reference to the PlaintiffRequirementin Defamatory Statements Directedat
Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.. 343,348 (2ooo).
40 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,777 (1986); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result). Dean Schauer
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ace, the cryoknives, of defamation lawsuits. To protect the "citizen-critic of
government,"4 the Constitution requires as a minimum that public officials
knowlprove that the defendant published the defamatory statement with
4
edge of the falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false. 1
Despite being lauded as a savior of free expression, the promise of the
Times has not been realized. The question of why it has not been realized
may have multiple instrumental, conceptual, or transactional answers. Nevertheless, the reason must rest in large measure on doctrinal impediments
that have developed in its wake. This Article will focus on the conceptual impediments that are most salient and amenable to elegant solution.
The first impediment stems from the courts' uncertainty, ambivalence, and
wavering over the extent to which the First Amendment limitations on
defamation claims are determined by a status-driven test, by a contentbased test, or by some sort of composite of the two. The post-New York
Times evolution began with an ostensible commitment to a status-driven
construct under which a plaintiff's burden in defamation would depend on
that plaintiff's status-whether he or she was a public official or a private
person. The New York Times rule was quickly extended to apply to public
figures. 43 From the beginning, however, the reality of the exclusiveness of a
status-based rule for delineating the scope of First Amendment restrictions
on defamation has been questionable. Imbedded in the voluntary public
figure analysis is the requirement of an underlying public controversy,
which inevitably calls for an assessment of the content of the subject matter. And, the possibility of involuntary public figures requires consideration
of content even more so.
Second, the boundaries and outlines of the public figure classification
have been formless and ill-defined. The hirsute contours of the public figure-private figure dichotomy have been especially vague for the involuntary public figure subcategory.
Third, the exclusiveness of the plaintiff's status in determining the relevant constitutional rule has given way, at least in some respects, to an
overtly binary matrix. Today, the level of constitutionally mandated limits
attributes the phrase's original incarnation, in the freedom of expression context, to Wieman
concurring). Frederick Schauer, Fear
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
Risk and the FirstAmendment: Unravelingthe "ChillingEffect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978).
For background on the concept, see Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 888-92 (2ooo). Even commentators who advocate
a more contextual, less rule-bound approach to freedom of speech concede the importance
of providing at least "the degree of certainty essential to secure freedom of speech from the
chilling effect of perceived regulation and that it affords unbridled judicial discretion." Tona
Trollinger, Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a Refuse of Dualism to the Reason of
Holism, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV.. 137, 228 1994).
41 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282.
42 See id.at 279-8o.
43 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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on state defamation law depends on two variables: "the status of the plaintiff-whether he was a private person or a public official or figure-and
the content of the communication-whether it was a matter of private or
public concern."" Attempting to assess each component individually has
proven frustrating enough, but taken together, the Court's constitutional
bipartite schema has multiplied the uncertainty by increasing the permutations. Uncertainty stems both from its inherent vagueness and the Court's
ambivalence about the nature and role of status-based rules and also from
doctrinal tension. The latter is a function of the reciprocal hampering effect in applying the potentially disparate focuses on status and content, and
attempting to harmonize both the status of the plaintiff (driven by respect
for the reputation and autonomy of individuals, with its uneven emphasis
on voluntariness and conscious choice to accept potential scrutiny) and the
content of the communication (with its focus impelled by First Amendment freedom of expression concerns). Tying the standards for defamation
to both status and content issues has multiplied the possible permutations,
compounding the uncertainty and unpredictability under the bipartite construct. Legal principles tend to become more, not less, certain over time.
This doctrinal entropy engenders uncertainty and difficulty in predicting
outcomes.
Finally, defining the scope of the First Amendment safeguards in terms
of status and content is too narrow, confining, and static a paradigm. It
should not matter, for the purposes of the First Amendment, whether on
any given day, a judge happens to deem or not deem a person to be a public figure. Nor should it matter whether a judge does or does not deem a
topic to be a matter of public concern. These determinations are hopelessly subjective and fluid. The narrow, time-bound status-content framework not only undermines the traditional self-governing role of freedom
of expression but also the realization of broader aims. Commentators are
increasingly coming to realize that the conception of the First Amendment
freedoms has focused too narrowly on the role of free communication in facilitating self-government. 4 Freedom of expression should be "envisioned
44 King, supra note 39, at 349.
45 See Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values,
Bollinger notes two principal themes in New York Times:

92 YALE

L. J. 438 (1983).

The first is the notion that the primary function of speech and press
is to advance the processes of self-government. The First Amendment
must be aligned with the preexisting societal choice of a democratic
form of government; it derives its function and legitimacy from serving
the process of self-government. And it does this primarily by standing
guard against attempts by government to interfere in the self-governing
process. The second major theme is the idea that the ultimate aim of the
First Amendment is the advancement of the public or collective good
and not that of any single individual

Id. at 439.

2oo6- 2007]

FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION LAW

more broadly as encompassing decisionmaking on all social values"' and
in the dialogic process by which language
the vital role of communication
47
is understood and evolves.
Rather than continue along a desultory path of trying to divine the contours of the status of plaintiffs and the public or private content of communications, or to reconcile the dissonant drags of status and content in
defining the scope of constitutional limitations on state defamation law,
this Article proposes an elegant solution. It is time to forthrightly extend
the requirement of proof of knowledge or reckless disregard, falsity, and a
provably false statement suggesting actual facts to all defamation plaintiffs
in all cases without regard to either the status of the plaintiff or the nature
of the content of the defendant's communication. This proposition has the
virtues of certainty, simplicity, and most importantly, affording decisive
support for the rights of freedom of expression. Nor would it depend on the
fiction that certain categories of plaintiffs somehow did or did not choose
their status, or on the ephemeral nature of "public concern."
Part II, A, of this article will discuss the leading post-Times Supreme
Court decisions. Part II, B, will examine the emergence of the dual statuscontent framework for determining constitutional limits on state defamation law. The Article will examine the public figure classification and its
amorphous parameters, particularly with respect to the involuntary public
figure subcategory. It will also discuss the role of the Dun & Bradstreetdecision in the emergence of the content component of the status-content
framework. The discussion in Part II, B will demonstrate the entropic disorder that has befallen First Amendment defamation jurisprudence in the
wake of New York Times. Finally, Part III sets forth a proposal for applying
the knowledge or reckless disregard and provably false statement requirements to all defamation plaintiffs.
46 Id. at 471.
47 Paul Chevigny conceives of the right to free expression more fundamentally as serving
a vital role in the dialogic process by which language itself is understood and evolves. See Paul
G. Chevigny, The Dialogic Right of Free Expression: A Reply to MichaelMartin, 57 N.Y. U. L. REV.
920 (1982). He writes:
A right to free expression need not be derived, as it has been
traditionally, from the personal autonomy of the individual and free
trade of ideas, but may also be rooted in the nature of language itself..
. Modern philosophy has come to accept the view that the meaning of
words is a social matter, depending on usage and context. The meaning
is ascertained through a dialogic process among participants. The
necessity of such a dialogue in order to understand words at all, rather
than merely to make decisions, gives rise to a necessity that the society
allow the dialogue to proceed ....
Id. at 920; see also PAUL G. CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY
75-8 o , 99, 122 (1988) (discussing the need for and role of freedom of expression for the vitality
of dialogue in the sharing of information and functioning and freely associating in a society).
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The remorseless increase in complexity and uncertainty of the post1964 constitutional defamation jurisprudence surely cannot be what those
transcending justices in New York Times foresaw when they came together
to draw that first line in the sand. But, predictability and certainty have
been elusive as each wave of doctrinal development passes over and erodes
the promise. It is the same type of phenomenon metaphorically depicted
by Leo Tolstoy at the conclusion of War andPeace.48 He teaches through his
nation-ship metaphor 9 that "[i]t is only by watching closely, moment by
moment, the movement of that flow, and comparing it with the movement
of the ship, that we are convinced that every moment that flowing by of the
waves is due to the forward movement of the ship, and that we have been
led into error by the fact that we are ourselves moving too." 0 Here too, the
difficulty in recognizing the erratic path of the law since the Times may rest
with our sense of doctrinal inertia flowing from the immanent embarkation
point of New York Times.
Without doubt, the entropy that has followed the New York Times decision has cast a shadow of uncertainty over the light of that case. As T. S.
Eliot hauntingly reminds us, "between the idea and the reality... falls the
shadow."'" The post-New York Times landscape is a shadowy world indeed.
We must not underestimate the stifling effects from uncertainty over the
threat of defamation liability and its ruinous consequences on freedom of
expression. After all, Cody's Books-the venerable Telegraph Avenue independent bookstore in Berkeley-was firebombed after it carried Salman
Rushdie's book, and that did not close it."2 Economics, however, did succeed in closing it. 3

48 See LEO NIKOLAYEVICH TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1131 (Constance Garnett trans.,
Modern Library ed. 1931) (1865).
49 Joseph H. King, PainandSuffening, Noneconomic Damages, andthe Goals of Tort Law, 57
SMU L. REV. 163, 167 (2004).
50 TOLSTOY, supra note 48, at 113 1.
51 TS. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN, available at http://www.cs.umbc.edu/-evans/hollow.
html (last visited Feb.

14, 2007).

See Steve Rubenstein & Henry K. Lee, Famed Bookstore's Last Chapter--Cody's on
Telegraph to Close, SAN FRANcisco CHRONICLE, May 10, 2006, at AI, available at http://sfgate.
com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2oo6o5/io/mngaqiovetl.dt (last visited Jan. 19, 2007). The
story notes that "[iun 1989, after a minor firebombing, the store announced that it would
continue to sell Salman Rushdie's controversial 'Satanic Verses,' a decision that owner Andy
Ross called 'our finest hour."' Id.
53 This Cody's location is going out of business under its current ownership and will
close (or presumably be sold to new owners). See id. Competition and declining sales from
chain stores and the internet doomed the store of this family business. See id.; see also Jesse
McKinley, In Berkeley, a Store's End Clouds a Street's Future,N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at Ai6
(noting that the store had been losing money for a number of years from competition from
superstores and internet outlets).
52
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II. THE COURT'S POsT-NEw YORK TMEs ENTROPY

A. The Status-BasedRule for DefiningFirstAmendment Limits
What promised to be the dawn of a new transparent era of free expression,
largely rescued from the threat of tripwire defamation liability, has fallen
short of those lofty hopes. The problem has come in the attempts by the
Supreme Court and lower courts to delineate the scope of constitutional
restrictions on defamation once we have passed beyond claims by public
officials. From the start, New York Times sequelae have come in tentative
and uncertain steps, and increasingly appear as chaotic groping for direction beset by increasing legal complexity.
Several years after New York Times, the Supreme Court decided Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts.s4 In that case, the Court extended its knowledgeor-reckless-disregard requirement to claims by public figures who were
neither associated with nor part of the government."5 The Court in Curtis
reasoned that the realities of the standing and role of public figures in modern society justified extension of the New York Times limitation to them as
well. Specifically, Chief Justice Warren pointed to the blurred distinction
between the governmental and private sectors; the "fusion of economic
and political power;" the increasingly organized power in the private sector; the influential role of the public figures in ordering society; the public
figures' access to the media; and the fact that powerful public figures not
employed by government "are not amenable to the restraints of the political process," which underscores the public interest in freedom of press to
6
discuss them.
Although the status of the plaintiffs-i.e., whether they were public or
private figures-had now become crucial, little attention was paid by the
Curtis Court to defining public figures. Justice Harlan observed that the
Curtis plaintiffs "commanded a substantial amount of independent public
interest at the time of the publications; both, in our opinion, would have

54 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

55 Although the lead opinion was written by Justice Harlan, his was a plurality opinion,
with Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joining, and thus it represented a minority position
with respect to the test applicable to public figures. See id. Harlan wanted a less demanding
test than the New York Times rule. See id. at 155. It was the opinion by Chief Justice Warren,
representing five votes, approving application of at least the New York Times limitation on
defamation liability to public figures, that carried the day. See id. ati62 (opinion by Warren,
C.J.) (calling for application of New York Times standard); id.at 170 (opinion by Black, J., with
Douglas, J., concurring) (calling for no liability for libel); id.at 172 (opinion by Brennan, J.,
with
White, J., joining) (agreeing with Chief Justice Warren that the New York Times actual malice
standard should be applied to public figures); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1013 (2d ed. 2002) ("Thus five Justices said that public figures

cannot recover for defamation with less than proof of actual malice.").
56 See Curtis Pub/'gCo., 388 U.S. at 163-64.
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been labeled 'public figures' under ordinary tort rules.""7 He also noted
that plaintiff-Butts may have attained that status by position alone" rather
than by "his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality
into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy,"58 and that "both commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to
the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." 9 It is evident that
a sizeable majority of the Court believed that even the plaintiff-athletic
director Butts was a public figure. 60 It seems problematic whether Butts
would qualify as either a voluntary or involuntary public figure under the
categories developed by the Court in its later Gertz 61 decision because Butts
had attained his status by "position alone" rather than through purposeful
activity.62
Four years later, the uncertainty over the role of status and content as
determinants of First Amendment limitations on defamation surfaced in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.6 Although there was no commanding opinion, and only eight justices participated, the plurality opinion by Justice
Brennan favored extending the New York Times requirements to even
private plaintiffs if the defendant's statement involved matters of public
concern. 64 A total of four justices agreed that such a measure was the very
least required.' Brennan reasoned: "Voluntarily or not, we are all 'public'
57 Id. at 154.
58 la. at 155.
59 Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
60 Chief Justice Warren, whose opinion carried the day on the applicability of the New
York Times requirement to public figures, said, "similarly, the seven members of the Court
who deem it necessary to pass upon the question agree that the respondents in these cases are
'public figures' for First Amendment purposes." Id. at 162.
61 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 4 18 U.S. 323 (i974); see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
62 See CurtisPubl'gCo., 388 U.S. at 154-55.
63 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
64 Four justices, including Justice Brennan, supported (at the very least) extending
the scope of the New York Times requirement to apply to private plaintiffs if the defendant's
statement involved matters of public concern. See id. at 43-44; id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
A fifth member of the Court, Justice White, although opposing liability, premised his decision
on the view that New York Times created a privilege allowing the press and media "to report
and comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, with no requirement
that the reputation or the privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the official
action be spared from public view [absent actual malice as defined in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan]." Id. at 62. Thus, Justice Brennan's view only carried 4 of the 8 Justices participating.
The remaining three justices, Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall, dissented on various grounds,
believing that private plaintiffs should only be required to prove negligence. See id. at 64
(Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 86-87. Thus, there was neither a majority opinion nor an
identifiable common ground that could be said to be endorsed by a majority of the Court.
65 Justice Black, one of the four concurringjustices, would go even further and completely
immunize the news media for statements of public concern "even when statements are
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men to some degree .... Thus, the idea that certain 'public' figures have
voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best,
a legal fiction."' He added:
It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New York
Times the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws
derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official,' 'public
figure,' or 'private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the
allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest .... [W]e think the time has come forthrightly to announce that the
determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions
is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general
concern, albeit leaving the delineation of the reach of that term to future
cases.

67

The Rosenbloom plurality was repudiated just three years later in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.' But, echoes of Rosenbloom have resonated through subsequent cases-and even in the Gertz case itself-as the Court attempted to
spell out the scope of the First Amendment limitations in defamation cases
and to elaborate, piecemeal, on the meaning of public figures. In Gerz, the
Court held that so long as the states "do not impose liability without fault,
[they] may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for
a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." 69 The Court also held that no presumed or punitive damages
could be awarded in a defamation case, at least in the absence of a showing
that the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard.70
broadcast with knowledge they are false." Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 48. He elaborated:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved,
or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose
to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the
public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect,
and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety .... We honor the commitment to robust debate on public
issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending
constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous.
Id. at 43-44.
67 Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
68 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 48 U.S. 323 0974).
69 Id. at 347.
70 See id. at 349. In other words, damages in such cases were limited to "actual injury,"
which would include not only economic loss but also for impairment of reputation, personal
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In applying a constitutional proof-of-fault requirement to private plaintiffs that was less demanding than the knowledge-or-reckless-disregard
requirement applicable to public officials and public figures, the Court
weighed competing social values. It thus sought to accommodate competing interests of both the First Amendment in free speech and the "legitimate state interest" in protecting the reputation that underlies state libel
law.71 The Court desired to justify a less demanding constitutional hurdle
for private plaintiffs and thus greater protection of their reputations by distinguishing them from public figures. First, reasoned the Court, the latter
have greater access to channels of communications." Second, public plaintiffs must be deemed to accept the consequences of their involvement in
public affairs or their engagement in public controversies.73 And, finally,
there is greater public interest in learning the personal attributes of officials
than of private persons.74 Gertz expressly repudiated the Rosenbloom plurality's "subject matter test"" as unworkable. An ad hoc approach evaluating
"First Amendment values" in every case would not be feasible.76 It would
be unpredictable and would make the role of appellate courts unmanageable.77
IBecause of the importance of Gem's public and private figures
dichotomy, the Court attempted to offer guidance on the nature of the public
figure category:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who
attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs
of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-

humiliation, and mental suffering. Id. at 350.
71 See id. at 341.
72

See id. at 344.

73 See id. at 345 ("Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public official and public
figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood concerning them.").
74 See id. at 344-45.
75 Lewis, supra note 1 2, at 768.
76 See Gerz, 418 U.S. at 346.
77 See id. at 343. The Court also reasoned that the Rosenbloom case-by-case approach
to deciding when to apply the more demanding New York Times requirement would be too
restrictive on state law and would abridge interests of states in protecting reputations of
private citizens to an unacceptable degree. On the other hand, the Rosenbloom plurality
would provide insufficient protection for the First Amendment when claims did not involve
matters of public concern because of the possibility of strict liability. Seeid.at 346.
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lar public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
8
involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.

But, the Court offered meager elaboration:
That designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range
of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the
9
resolution of public questions.

The Court's acceptance-of-the-risk rationale seemed precarious from the
start. First, the Court said that the test was not actual willingness but the
appearance of public figure status.80 Second, the Court expressly recognized the possibility that a person could involuntarily become a limited
purpose public figure.
Not long after Gertz, the Supreme Court decided three cases addressing
the public figure question. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,8 ' the Court held that
a plaintiff engaged in divorce proceedings characterized by the trial court
as a "cause celebre" with "the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families" was not a public figure.8" Three years later, in Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,83 the Court held that a behavioral research scientist engaged in
government sponsored research who was also research director of a nonprofit corporation was not a public figure in connection with bestowal on
him of the "Golden Fleece" award by Senator Proxmire. And in Wolston
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,8 s the Court held that a nephew of Soviet spies who
failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena and was cited for contempt during a grand jury investigation of Soviet espionage, was not a public figure.86
In all three cases, the Court seemed intent on distancing itself from even
the possibility that someone might become a public figure involuntarily.

78 Id. at 345.
79 Id. at 35 .
80 See id. at 344-45. To underscore the point, the Court added: "Even if the foregoing
generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on
the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." Id. at 345.
81 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
82 Id. at 453-55.
83 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
84 See id. at 133-36.
85 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
86 Seeid. at 167.
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All three opinions selectively quote from Gertz so as to omit its reference to involuntary public figures.87 That selective use of the Gerz language seemed a calculated blink at even the theoretical possibility of involuntary public figures. In each of the three cases, the Court pointedly
noted that the plaintiff did not "thrust" himself or herself into a public controversy.8 Except for a vague remark in Firestone,89 the Court did not even
acknowledge the existence of the involuntary public figure classification.
This point was driven home in Wolston, where the court emphasized that
the plaintiff was "dragged unwillingly into the controversy." 90 The Court
explained that "[a] private individual is not automatically transformed into
a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter
that attracts public attention," and that the "defendant must show more
than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden
of New York Times."'" By deliberately ignoring the involuntary public figure
possibility, these cases arguably close the door on any retreat from the primacy of a status-driven rule.
While the language in the Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston trilogy
could be taken as a negative signal for the vitality of the involuntary public
figure classification, 9 the cases probably do not categorically repudiate the
involuntary public figure. It is important to note that the Court did not say
that it was repudiating the involuntary public figure. More to the point, all
three cases were decided on grounds other than a frontal holding that the
involuntary public figure classification was no longer an option. 9 In each of

87 In each case, the Court omitted reference to the crucial "hypothetically..." sentence
of Gertz. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164; Hutchinson,443 U.S. at 134; Firestone,424 U.S. at 453.
88 See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166; Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135; Firestone,4z4 U.S at 453.
89 See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 476 n. 4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a law review
article that concludes that Gertz as suggests "a 'category of involuntary public figures' roughly
equivalent to individuals involved in or affected by ... official action"') (quoting David A.
Anderson, Libel and PressSe/f-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV.. 422, 450-51 (1975)).
90 Woston, 443 U.S. at i66.
91 Id. at 167-68. The Court expressly rejected the defendants' contention that anyone
who "engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of
comment on a limited range of issues relating to his conviction." Id. at 168.
92 See, e.g., I RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION § 2:33 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that
"This trilogy of post-Gertz cases-Firestone,Wolston, and Hutchinson-appearsto take virtually
all of the oxygen out of the one-sentence musing in Gertz hypothesizing the possibility of
involuntary public figures."); Dale K. Nichols, Comment, The Involuntary Public FigureClassof
Gertz v. Welch: Dead orMerely Dormant?,14 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 71, 8o, 83-84 (1980) (noting
that "[a] strong case can be made that ... Firestone destroyed the involuntary public figure
class," and that the Firestone,Hutchinson, and Wolston cases may have abolished the involuntary
public figure class sub silentio).
93 See W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 15-17 (2003) (noting the issues other than involuntary public figure status
that were involved in each case); Nichols, supra note 92, at 8o-83 (identifying the narrower
grounds for the decision in each case).
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the three there was arguably a basis for deciding that the plaintiff was not
a public figure besides the mere fact that the plaintiff had not voluntarily
thrust himself or herself into a public controversy. In both Firestone and
Hutchinson the Court found insufficient evidence of the existence of public
controversy,94 and in Wolston the Court relied on the fact that the plaintiff
played a "minor role"-not a central role-in the public controversy over
Soviet espionage.95 Thus, it is apparent that the existence of a public controversy-and the plaintiff's central role with it-is essential even in the
recognition of voluntary public figures.'
B. Emergence of a Content Component in the Status-ContentDualism
The exclusiveness of a narrow status-based rule for determining constitutional limitations on defamation has been illusory almost from the start.
There have been three overarching influences contributing to the rise of a
content-based component for determining the scope of First Amendment
limits on state defamation law. First, as evidenced in both Gertz and the Firestone, Hutchinson,and Wolston trilogy, the classification of a voluntary limited
purpose public figure has been anchored to the presence of a public controversy.97 Admittedly, the Court has, in Hutchinson in particular, attempted to
keep separate the ideas of a public controversy for the purposes of public
figures and matters of public concern more generally.98 But, it seems to be
a blurred, fluid dichotomy. Behind both a finding of a public controversy
and a matter of public concern is the public interest served in airing the
story. Second, the Court's express recognition in Gertz of involuntary public
figures leads inexorably to considerations of the nature of the content of
the communication. And finally, in 1985, the Court in Dun &Bradstreet expressly adopted a content-based rule as one of the determinants for at least
some First Amendment limitations on defamation. 99 That was followed a

94 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Firestone,424 U.S at 454. Writing
for the Court in Firestone,Justice Rehnquist concluded that the "[dlissolution of a marriage
through judicial proceedings was not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gert.
Firestone,424 U.S. at 454. The Court in Hutchinson noted that a defendant could not bootstrap
plaintiff into becoming a public figure by dragging him into the national spotlight by the
very communication that is the basis for the lawsuit: "Clearly, those charged with defamation
cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135. The Court noted that the defendant had not identified "such a
particular controversy; at most, they point to concern about general public expenditures. But
that concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures: it is not sufficient to
make [plaintiff] a public figure." Id. at 135.
95 See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
96 See infra Part II, B, i.
97 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
98 See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-36; see also infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
99 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985).
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year later by PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,"0 in which the Court
held that "at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern,
a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that
the statements at issue are false."10 1And, in 1990, the Court in Milkovich v.
Lorain JournalCo.,1°z held that "a statement of opinion relating to matters
of public concern which does not contain a provably
false factual connota' 10 3
tion will receive full constitutional protection."
The result of all of this has been an ill-defined dual set of determinants
of the scope of constitutional limits on defamation, the effect of which has
been the further clouding of the doctrinal landscape that was supposed to
afford reassurance and encouragement to communicators regarding their
potential jeopardy from oppressive defamation claims. These matters are
discussed below.
1.Public ControversyFocus of the Limited Purpose Voluntary Public FigureClassification.-In general, the question of the status of the plaintiff is a question of law for the court. 104 The Supreme Court, however, has not offered
meaningful guidance on the criteria for determining the crucial matter of
the plaintiff's status."0 ' The influential'0 6 post-Gertz opinion in Waldbaum
v. FairchildPublications, Inc. observed that "[ulnfortunately, the Supreme
Court has not yet fleshed out the skeletal descriptions of public figures
and private persons enunciated in Gertz. The very purpose of the rule announced in New York Times [sic], however, requires courts to articulate
clear standards that can guide both the press and the public."' 17 Waldbaum
offered the following often-cited three-step analysis for the most litigated
public figure subcategory, the limited purpose voluntary public figure:
As the first step in its inquiry, the court must isolate the public controversy.
A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must

ioo Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
IoI Id. at 768-69.
102 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
103 Id. at 2o.The Court added that the constitution also precluded liability for statements
that could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts. Id.
104 See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 Fad 1072, io8i n.4 (3d
Cir. 1985) (stating that "[tihe classification of a plaintiff as a public or private figure is a
question of law to be determined initially by the trial court and then carefully scrutinized by
an appellate court." (citations omitted)).
105 Id. at 1o82 ("Without a precise diagram for guidance, courts and commentators have
had considerable difficulty in determining the proper scope of the public figure doctrine"
(footnote omitted)).
io6 See, e.g., Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., No. 95-28 5 -M, 1999 WL 813909, at *2 (D.N.H.
May 19, 1999) (noting that "[tihe proper standards for determining whether plaintiffs are
limited public figures are best set forth in Waldbaum").
107 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 Fzd 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
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be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some
segment of it in an appreciable way .... [E]ssentially private concerns
or disagreements do not become public controversies simply because they
attract attention .... Once the court has defined the controversy, it must
analyze the plaintiff's role in it ....The language of Gertz [sic] is clear that
plaintiffs must have "thrust themselves to the forefront" of the controverThey must have
sies so as to become factors in their ultimate resolution ....
achieved a "special prominence" in the debate .... The plaintiff either
must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of his position in the controversy, to have
an impact on its resolution ....Finally, the alleged defamation must have
108
been germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy ....
The other leading case, Wells v. Liddy,1°9 uses a six-part test for voluntary
public figure status:
[Tlhe defendant must prove that: (1) the plaintiff has access to channels
of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of
special prominence in the public controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy; (4) the controversy
existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement; and (5) the
plaintiff retained public-figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.
...[(6) And, as] an additional consideration [,J ...if the content of a defamatory statement touches upon an area that state law has traditionally considered to be defamatory per se, then the plaintiff cannot be categorized as a
limited-purpose public figure solely because he makes reasonable public
replies to the statement.i'
As is obvious from these two leading cases, the common denominator in
most cases addressing the limited purpose voluntary public figure subcategory has been the requirement of a public controversy and the plaintiff's
voluntary participation in it. Thus, Gertz reduced the "public-figure question . ..to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." 'i This means that
io8 Id. at 1296-98 (citations and footnotes omitted).
1o9 Wells v. Liddy, 186 F3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. to18 (2000).
1 Io
Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
i i i Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); see also DAN B. DOBBS, ThE
LAw OF TORTS § 418, at 1175 (2000) (noting that "[c]ourts often conclude that the plaintiff
is not a limited purpose public figure unless (a)there was a pre-existing public controversy
and (b) the plaintiff injected herself into that controversy by voluntary action" (footnotes
omitted)); SMOLLA,SUpra note

92,

§ 2:21 ("One of the common denominators running through

Gema, Firestone, Woston, and Hutchinson is the requirement that the plaintiff, to be classified
as a limited public figure, must have voluntarily injected himself into a matter of 'public
controversy.' This requirement obviously puts great definitional pressure on the term 'public
controversy,' and explication of that term has proved to be central to the efforts of lower
courts to apply the public figure/private figure distinction." (footnotes omitted)); Christopher
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even under an ostensibly status-based test, the courts are necessarily still
forced to reflect on the content of the statement. How else does one decide
whether, in the words of Waldbaum, the controversy is not only a "real dispute,"" ' but one "the outcome of which affects the general pubic or some
1 13
segment of it in an appreciable way"?
The classification of a person as a voluntary public figure is inherently
unpredictable. As one court remarked, "Although the public figure concept
has eluded a truly working definition, it falls within that class of legal abstractions where 'I know it when I see it .... 11114 As an example of just how
amorphous and lacking in rigor the status-based limited purpose "voluntary" public figure classification can be, consider the analysis in one recent
article. 1 5 The writer contends that:
[P]articipants in reality television shows should be treated as limited-purpose public figures. In practice, this means that these pseudo-celebrities
may only gain attention in relation to their status as a reality television participant .... [Tihe extent of public scrutiny these individuals may receive
will be directly correlated with the level of their involvement in their indi16
vidual reality program."
The outcome here is said to depend on the type of reality show and what
outcome the participant is seeking to influence." 7 Such an adhoc analysis
R. Smith, Note, DraggedInto the Vortex: ReclaimingPrivatePlaintiffs' Interests in Limited Purpose
Public FigureDoctrine,89 IowA L. REV.. 1419, 1435 (2004) (noting that the tests for the limited
purpose public figure category "have two basic considerations in common: the nature and the
extent of the plaintiff's involvement in a public controversy").
112 Waldbaum, 627 E2d at 1296.
113 Id.
1'4 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 580 Ezd 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
115 See Darby Green, Almost Famous: Reality Television Participantsas Limited-Purpose
Public Figures,6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 94, 1o6-07 (2003).
116 Id. at 107.
117 On the public controversy element, he says that "reality television arguably satisfies
the criteria of a public controversy because of the ongoing debate regarding the advantages
and disadvantages of the entire programming genre. Thus, just by participating in reality
television programming, an individual may satisfy the first prong of the test for limitedpurpose figure status." Id. at io6 (footnote omitted).
And on the requirement that plaintiffhave voluntarily thrust himself into the "controversy,"
he comments:
The plaintiff must have sought to influence the resolution or
outcome of the controversy. In the realm of dating reality shows, this role
is solely acquired by the main character, and the other participants act
in relation to him or her. In the competition-driven shows, each of the
participants intends to influence the program's outcome by emerging as
the victor. However, in shows professing to portray real life, participants
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is hopelessly vague and subjective. Moreover, it would be oppressive and
unworkable for the trial and appellate courts and would pose unacceptable
uncertainty for publishers.
2. Involuntary Public Figures: Slouching Towarda Content-Based Calibration
of Limitations on Defamation.-A more direct embrace of a content-based
orientation in deciding the scope of First Amendment limitations on defamation can be found in the involuntary public figure classification. The
possibility of one becoming an involuntary public figure was expressly legitimized by the language in Gertz that "[h]ypothetically, it may be possible
for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his
own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceed1 18
ingly rare."
Thus, Gertz added to the unpredictability and uncertainty by expressly
opening the door to the possibility of an involuntary public figure-albeit
a "truly rare" species. That, in turn, left open the possibility of erosion of
the exclusivity or even primacy of the status-based rule for defining the
parameters of First Amendment limitations on defamation. In other words,
if it is indeed possible to become a public figure involuntarily, then the
crucial inquiry would inexorably shift both from the plaintiff's status and
from the Gertz opinion's most important rationale-the "compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs" that public persons "must accept the necessary
'
consequences of that involvement in public affairs."119
Instead of an exclusively or even paramountly status-driven analysis, the possibility of an
involuntary public figure necessarily shifts the focus to the nature of the
underlying public controversy, and inevitably to the nature of the contcnt
of the defendant's statement.
Gertz offered virtually no meaningful guidance with respect to the involuntary public figure subcategory. The leading Waldbaum case also reflected the Court's equivocation on the nature of the involuntary public
figure subcategory and whether or the extent to which its subjects are involuntary. The court stated: "Occasionally, someone is caught up in the
controversy involuntarily and, against his will, assumes a prominent position in its outcome. Unless he rejects any role in the debate, he too has
'invited comment' relating to the issue at hand."'' 10
merely hope to garner media attention and do not wish to affect the
outcome of the program with any specific significance.
Id. at io6. The author then seems to back away from his initial conclusion, saying, "[tihe lack
of intent shown by the large majority of reality television participants provides evidence that
they do not rise to the level of public figure required by the Reuber test." Id.
1i8 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345 (1974).
i9 Id.
120 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cit. 198o).
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The involuntary public figure classification has contributed to the reemergence of content-based analysis and to the underlying confusion. Although the courts have not agreed on the legal framework of the involuntary public figure subcategory, or even on its continued validity, most
seem to agree that an alleged defamatory statement must relate to a public
controversy.' That necessarily leads to considerations of content.' Moreover, the possibility of one becoming an involuntary public figure leads to
consideration of the content of the statement since the relevance of the
status of the plaintiff is reduced. The potential existence of involuntary
public figures directly challenges the fundamental premise on which the
distinction between public and private plaintiffs was supposed to restthat the former assumed the risk of less protection for their reputations. 3
Confusion caused by the potential involuntary public figure category has
been compounded by uncertainty over the standing or contours of the involuntary public figure classification.
A variety of approaches to the involuntary public figure subcategory
have been adopted by the courts or characterized by commentators. These
approaches are discussed briefly below. The dizzying variety of approaches
is enough on its own to demonstrate the post-New York Times entropy.

iz See id. at 1296; see also Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 E3d 1541, 1554-55
(4th Cir.1994) (indicating that the public controversy requirement is a preliminary inquiry);
James Chadwick, Comment, A Conflict in the PublicInterest:Defamationandthe Role of Content in
the Wake of Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997, 1012 (i991)
("[Dleciding exactly what makes a plaintiff a public figure is not a simple task, nor does it free
the court from considerations of content. As an examination of the criteria established by the
federal courts in Waldbaum v. FairchildPublicationsand the cases following it discloses, the
analysis of whether a statement involved a "public controversy" would turn out to be central
to that definition. These criteria ... essentially require the court to consider both the nature
of the controversy in which the plaintiff is involved, and the content of the statements about
the plaintiff. The status-based test, then, did not relieve the courts of the task that the Gertz
majority found so onerous: that of analyzing and categorizing the content of the defamatory
statement." (footnotes omitted)); id. at ioz5 ("Taken together, the criteria adopted by the
Waldbaum court form a test in which the dominant concerns are the content of the defamatory
statement and whether that content involves issues of public importance.")
122 See Chadwick,supra note 121, at 1012.
123 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
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a. DeadLetter.-Some cases" 4 and commentators"25 suggest that the involuntary public figure subcategory is becoming a dead letter or is heading
in that direction. They have usually pointed to the Firestone,Hutchinson,and
Wolston trilogy and the deadening silence of the Court with respect to the
involuntary public figure category.1 6 Other cases have taken to essentially
ignoring the classification's existence, or at least deigning not to acknowl-

124 See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F3d 505,538 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. i i18 (2000)
(commenting that "[slo rarely have courts determined that an individual was an involuntary
public figure that commentators have questioned the continuing existence of that category");
,
Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F Supp. 551 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (opining that the
Firestone case "forecloses the possibility" of the involuntary limited-purpose public figure);
Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 Pzd 562 (Ariz. 1986). The Dombey court expressly
disclaimed any reliance on a claim that the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure, expressing
doubt on the subcategory's continued existence. It commented that "aside from its articulation
in Gertz, it [the involuntary public status] has never been applied by the Supreme Court and
may have been abandoned." Id. at 567; see infra note 165 and notes 176-80 and accompanying
text for a more in-depth discussion of Dombey.
125 See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 92, § 2:33 (stating that "[it is not at all clear that this
language in Gertz was anything more than musing dicta," and that subsequent Supreme Court
cases have taken all of the "oxygen" out of the Gertz involuntary public figure language);
Nichols, supra note 92, at 8o--82; David L. Wallis, Note, The Revival of Involuntary LimitedPurpose Public Figurs-Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 1987 BYU L. REv. 313,
323-24 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court "has not acknowledged the existence of the
involuntary public figure category" since Gertz and urging the lower courts not to attempt to
fit plaintiffs into the "illusive category of involuntary public figures").
126 See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Of Public Fgures and Public Interest-the Libel Law
Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARv L. REV.. 937, 941 n.28 (1984) ("The Court's subsequent [postGertz] decisions ... have eliminated even this possibility"); David Elder, Defamation, Public
Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria-A Proposalfor Revivification: Two Decades after
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFFALO L. REV.. 579, 613 n.141 (1984) (stating that "it is
highly doubtful if such a sub-status continues to exist in light of the post-Gertz decisions of
the Court. It is noteworthy that the Court subsequently reinterpreted Gertz as specifying only
,two ways' of becoming a 'public figure'-'all' or 'limited' purpose" (citing Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979)); David A. Elder, Kentucky Defamation andPrivacy Lawthe Last Decade, 23 N. Ky. L. REV.. 231, 233 n. 14 (1996) (noting that since Gertz the Court "has
not discussed the 'involuntary' designation in any subsequent opinion" (citation omitted));
Mark Rosen, Media Lament-The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures, 54 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 487, 502 (1980) (commenting that the involuntary public figure category is "all but
extinct"); Mark T Karinja, Comment, Defamation: Conflict in the Definition of "Public Figure," io
SETON HALL L. REV. 822,846 (980) (stating that "it is apparent that the [Supreme] Court has
rejected sub silentio" the involuntary public figure classification); Nichols, supra note 92, at 80,
82 (stating that "[a] strong case can be made that... Firestonedestroyed the involuntary public
figure class," and that the Firestone,Hutchinson, and Wolston cases appear to have abolished
the involuntary public figure class sub slentio" and have dealt the involuntary public figure
classification a "death blow"); Wallis, supra note 125, at 319 (contending that "the existence
of an involuntary public figure is hypothetical at best," and pointing to Wolston as "further
evidence of the demise of the involuntary public figure category").
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edge it."2 7 Some other courts pay lip service to the involuntary public figure
category but then essentially act as though it were not a viable option." 8
127 See, e.g.,Waymentv. ClearChannel Broad., Inc., 16P.3d 271 (Utah 2oo5). In Wayment,
a local television health reporter claimed that her former employer defamed her by stating she
had been terminated because she used her reporter contacts to attempt to start a children's
cancer foundation for her benefit. See id. at 277. The Supreme Court of Utah held that even if
this situation had been a public controversy, that the plaintiff was not a limited-purpose public
figure because she did not "voluntarily thrust herself to the forefront of the controversy." Id.
at 285. The court relied on a narrow reading of Wolston, saying:

[Classifying the plaintiff as a public figure] would be equivalent to
holding that any individual who engages in activities that attract public
attention thereby injects himself into a public controversy over the
conduct. The Supreme Court eschewed such a result in Wolston, refusing
to hold the plaintiff a public figure based on his "failure to appear before
the grand jury and citation for contempt" even though this behavior
attracted significant media attention ....
The Court explained that
the plaintiff did not "invite a citation for contempt in order to use the
contempt citation as a fulcrum to create public discussion about the
methods being used in connection with an investigation or prosecution."
... Because the plaintiff did not intend his action "to draw attention to
himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public with
respect to any issue," he was not a limited-purpose public figure ....
Similarly here, nothing in the record even hints that Wayment sought to
create a. conflict of interest in order to stimulate public debate on such
matters.
Id. (quoting Woston, 443 U.S. at 167-68). Since the court held that no public controversy
existed, it would be impossible for Wayment to become an involuntary public figure. However,
the case is important to an overall analysis of the involuntary public figure doctrine because the
Wayment court did not even acknowledge the possibility that the plaintiff could have become
a public figure through no voluntary action of her own. See id. Instead, the Court focused on
Justice Powell's statement in Gertz that public figure status rests on "'either of two alternative
bases."' Id. at 279 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). In reality, Justice Powell in Gertz was
referring to all-purpose and voluntary limited-purpose public figures. Nevertheless, Wayment
apparently took this language to mean that involuntary public figures, an independent third
category within Gerz, either do not exist or are so rare as to make even their consideration
unnecessary.
128 See Tomson v. Stephan, 699 E Supp. 86o (D. Kan. 1988); Sewell v. Trib Publ'ns, Inc.,
No. Ao5A2o77, 2005 WL 2901674 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2005). In Tomson, the court held that
the plaintiff, who had settled a sexual harassment lawsuit against the state attorney general
and his associate, was not a public figure. See Tomson, 699 E Supp. at 867. The court discussed
the case of Dameron v. Washington Magazine,Inc., but in light of its limiting language, found it
"of little precedential value," and distinguishable because of the strong vested public interest
in airline crashes. Id. at 865-66.
In Sewele,
the plaintiff-professor sued a newspaper publisher for defamation for reporting
that he had made anti-American comments about the war in Iraq in class without allowing the
expression of contrary views. The court expressly acknowledged that Gertz had recognized
that "a limited-purpose public figure may become so either voluntarily or involuntarily." Id. at
*3. But then, the court proceeded to analyze issue of the plaintiff's status exclusively in terms
of whether the plaintiff "by discussing the controversy in his classroom .... thrust himself to
the forefront of the controversy." Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not done so,
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b. Merle Dameron 's "sheer bad luck".- At the other end of the spectrum,
29
there is the approach represented by Dameron v. Washington Magazine,Inc.
Merle Dameron was the sole air traffic controller on duty at Dulles Airport
the tragic day in 1974 when a TWA airplane crashed into Mt. Weather.130
He sued for defamation based on a magazine's lengthy article on another
airline crash that stated that some air traffic controllers "have been assigned
partial blame in a few accidents," including the 1974 TWA crash. 13' The
court of appeals expressly held that the plaintiff was an involuntary public
figure. The court reasoned:
It is true ...that Dameron cannot fairly be said to have "injected" himself
into the controversy. This one factor, however, is not the be-all and end-all
of public figure status. Injection is not the only means by which public-figure status is achieved. Persons can become involved in public controversies
and affairs without their consent or will. Air-controller Dameron, who had
the misfortune to have a tragedy occur on his watch, is such a person. We
conclude that Dameron did become an involuntary public figure for the limited purpose of discussions of the Mt. Weather crash ....He is an ordinary
citizen who was completely unknown to the public before the Mt. Weather
crash, never sought to capitalize on the fame he achieved through the Mt.
Weather crash, and never acquired any notoriety apart from the crash. Dameron is not by any means, therefore, a general-purpose public figure. However, we think the public-figure doctrine ... encompasses Mr. Dameron 3and
raises him, involuntarily, to the status of limited-purpose public figure.'
The court elaborated, "[w]e think that within the very narrow framework
represented by the facts of this case, such has been Dameron's fate. By
sheer bad luck, Dameron happened to be the controller on duty at the time
Dameron 'assume[d a] special prominence in
of the Mt. Weather crash ....
He became embroiled, through no
the resolution of [a] public question[ ].'
desire of his own, in the ensuing controversy over the causes of the accident. He thereby became well known to the public in this one very limited
133
connection."
and therefore remained a private figure. Id. As a result, the plaintiff was only required to prove
negligence in his defamation claims. Id. The court determined that therefore his defamation
claims should not have been dismissed. Id.
129 Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1141(1986).
130 Seeid. at 738.
131 See id.
132 Id. at 740-41. The court pointed out that "[in Getz the Supreme Court noted that it
is 'possible to become a public figure through no purposeful action of [one's] own' although it
added that 'the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."' Id. at
742 (quoting Gertz, 3 i8 U.S. at 345).
133 Id. at 742 (quoting Gertz, 318 U.S. at 351). The court distinguished Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc. It noted that Dameron was a central figure in the "discrete and specific
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Despite the court's reassurances that "[t]he circumstances in which an
involuntary public figure is created will ... continue to be few and far
between,"' 34 its approach contained few discernible limitations on the
involuntary public figure classification except for the requirement of the
plaintiff's "central" 31 involvement in a public controversy. Indeed, some
have read the case broadly to signal a re-emergence of a Rosenbloom con136
tent-centric rule.

public controversy with respect to which he was allegedly defamed-the controversy over
the cause of the Mt. Weather crash." Id. at 742-43. "Wolston, by contrast, was not defamed
with respect to the controversy in which he played a central role-his refusal to testify before
a grand jury-but rather with respect to a controversy in which he played a role that was at
most tangential-the investigation of Soviet espionage in general." Id. at 743 (citing Wolston
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)).
134 Id. at 743.
135 Id. at 741 (noting that there was "no question that Dameron played a central, albeit
involuntary, role in this controversy"); see also Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43,
50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff's "role in the controversy was far more than 'tangential' or
'trivial').
136 See Wells v. Liddy, i86 F3d 505, 539 (4th Cir. 1999), cer. denied, 528 U.S. i i 18 (2o0o)
("Because Dameron has not narrowly tailored the class of possible involuntary public figures, it
has created a class of individuals who must prove actual malice that is equivalent to the class
in Rosenbloom. Under either Dameron or Rosenbloom all individuals defamed during discourse
on a matter of public concern must prove actual malice. In light of the Supreme Court's
repeated rejection of Rosenbloom, we are unwilling to adopt an approach that returns us to an
analysis that is indistinguishable."); Wallis, supra note 125, at 320 (stating the court's analysis
in Dameron leads to reemergence of Rosenbloom public interest test).
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A number of cases have approved the Dameron holding or utilized a
similar approach,'37 sometimes with little or no analysis.138 Consider, for example, Wagstaff v. Morning Call, Inc.'39 The defendant-newspaper reported
137 See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 FSupp. 2d 25,44 (D.D.C.), aff'don othergrounds, 350
E 3 d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that plaintiff, one of the first two women trained to fly the
Navy's F-14 fighter aircraft, was "a limited purpose public figure, albeit possibly involuntary");
Atlanta Humane Soc'y v. Mills, 618 S.E.2d 18, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2oo5) (finding that the plaintiff
was a voluntary public figure, but also recognizing at least in principle the "possibility of an
involuntary public figure" when someone is caught up in a controversy involuntarily); Atlanta
Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 55S S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a security
guard who became focus of investigation in connection with the 1996 Centenial Olympic Park
bombing and who variously was portrayed as hero and suspect, and was eventually cleared of
any involvement, was an involuntary limited purpose public figure); Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v.
Dow Jones & Co., 687 N.Y.S.zd 64, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (citing Dameron) (holding that an
art restorer who used a controversial restoration technique was an involuntary limited purpose
public figure); Wagstaff v. Morning Call, Inc., 41 Pa. D.&C. 4th 431, 437-43 (Ct. C.P. Lehigh
County 1999), aff'd, 758 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Erdmann v. SF Broad. of Green Bay,
Inc., 599 N.W.2d 1, 5-7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff, 543 N.W.2d 522,
533 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (food processor and its president were involuntary public figures in
connection with report that they failed to immediately comply with government's request
to recall contaminated food and the public controversy surrounding potential distribution of
contaminated food products); Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that the farmer with the largest acreage of land area that allegedly eroded and
contributed to pollution of a state park was an involuntary limited purpose public figure). The
language in Wiegel is revealing:
We agree with this analysis and believe that the focus of the inquiry
should be on the plaintiff's role in the public controversy rather than
on any desire for publicity or other voluntary act on his or her part.
The purpose served by protecting the press from defamation suits for
comment on public issues and the people involved in those issues could
well be frustrated if the individuals could, by themselves and wholly
independent of their involvement in the controversy, determine whether
they are, or are not, "public figures."

The trial court concluded that Wiegel was a private, not a public,
figure because he was a "reluctant participant in the public controversy
generated by the DNR's concern over the water quality in Yellowstone
Lake ....
We consider the conclusion to be legally erroneous because
we believe Wiegel's desire--or lack of desire-to draw attention to
himself is irrelevant ....
Even if Wiegel did not consciously or voluntarily thrust himself
into the dispute, he may nonetheless be a limited purpose public figure
if his activities "almost inevitably put him into the vortex of a public
controversy."
Id. at 5 o , The court added that it was "inevitable that the controversy would focus on ... the
farmer with the largest acreage in the area." Id.
138 See Daniel Goldreyer Ltd., 687 N.Y.S.2d 64; Bay View Packing Co., 543 N.W.2d 522.
139 Wagstaff, 41 Pa. D.&C. 4 th 431.
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that an auto repair garage was the base of operation of two persons who
had committed a violent bank robbery. 4 Actually, the subject garage was
a separate garage in the same building that the plaintiff had rented to a
third person.'41 The owner of the garage sued for defamation."4 The court
invoked Dameron, and held that the plaintiff was a public figure. 143 Specifically, the court stated that "it is not necessary for a plaintiff to have injected
himself voluntarily into a public controversy, or foresaw becoming involved
in it, in order to be deemed a limited purpose public figure."'" The court
emphasized that the subject was "a brazen criminal act of breathtaking
proportion ... committed on the public streets," 145 and that the article addressed "questions of immediate public concern involving... the safety of
the community... [and] the integrity of of its banks."'' 4 Finally, the court
noted that the "[p]laintiff, by his own conduct, was drawn into these questions. He leased space which became the robbers' base of operations ....
To
47
that extent, plaintiff found himself in the path of legitimate inquiry."'
Perhaps the quintessential example of the Dameron approach is represented by Atlanta Journal-Constitutionv. Jewell.'48 The court held that,
Richard Jewell, a security guard who became the focus of investigation
in connection with the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing and who
was variously portrayed as hero and suspect before being cleared of any
involvement, was at least an involuntary limited-purpose public figure, if
not a voluntary limited-purpose public figure. 149 The Jewellcourt expressly
relied on Dameron, saying:
The same considerations that led the Dameron court to find the plaintiff
in that case was an involuntary public figure require the same conclusion
in this case. Even if we found that Jewell did not "inject" himself into the
controversy, "[ilnjection is not the only means by which public-figure status
is achieved. Persons can become involved in public controversies and affairs without their consent or will." Jewell, who had the misfortune to have
a tragedy occur on his watch, is such a person. 50

140 See id. at 433.
141 See id.at 435 n.2.
142

Seeid. at 434.

143 See id. at 439-43.
144 Id. at 439.
145 Id. at 442.
146 Id. at 442.
147 Id. at 443.
148 Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.zd 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
149 Seeid. at 186.
i5o Id. (quoting Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.zd 736, 741 (D.C. 1985)).
The court further explained:
[T]here is no question that Jewell played a central, albeit possibly
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In light of these cases, one can understand how the Dameron case has
been criticized in terms of its potential breadth and open-endedness. I I Its
broad view of the involuntary public figure subclassification has also been
2
rejected by some courts on that basis.1
involuntary, role in the controversy over Olympic Park safety. Jewell
happened to be the security guard on duty at the time of the bombing,
happened to be the security guard who found the bomb, and happened
to be involved in the evacuation of the public from the area where the
bomb was located. He became embroiled in the ensuing discussion and
controversy over park safety and became well known to the public in
this one very limited connection. Whether he liked it or not, Jewell
became a central figure in the specific public controversy with respect to
which he was allegedly defamed: the controversy over park safety.
Jewell, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
151 Dean Smolla has written:
In setting the doctrinal parameters of the involuntary public
figure concept in terms far too elastic, the Dameron formulation invites
acceptance of a class of involuntary public figures far too expansive ....
For if all that is required to qualify as an involuntary public figure under
Dameron is the bad luck of some central connection to [a] newsworthy
event, involuntary figures are not by any calculation exceedingly rare,
but exceedingly common, and growing more common all the time. Any
of us, at any moment, might find ourselves swept up in some dramatic
or traumatic event that becomes the focus of intense public inquiry or
debate. The sad fact is that bad luck is relatively common ....
SMOLLA, supra note 92, § 2:35.5o. He elaborates:

As new technologies make it increasingly routine, in this epoch
of the "media feeding frenzy," the "fifteen minutes of fame," or the
"media firestorm," for an obscure person who is just going about his or
her business to suddenly be placed in a "central role" in some sudden
story du jour, and instantly broadcast around the world on satellite,
radio, television, cable, and the Internet, our law must decide whether
it must serve as the hapless vassal to such phenomenon, or will instead
assert itself, and anchor public figure doctrine on firmer moral and policy
sensibilities.
Id.
Finally, Smolla adds:
The public figure doctrine is heavily grounded in cultural and moral
equity-if you can't stand the heat of the fire, stay out of the kitchen
... . [Tihose who voluntarily seek to influence events and issues
may appropriately be forces to accept as part of the bargain a greater
risk of defamation. But when reputational redress for defamation is
substantially diminished by the 'sheer bad luck' of one's connection to
a newsworthy event, the law has lost its tie to these moral assumptions
and policy functions.
Id.
152 See supra notes Io9-Io and accompanying text; infra notes 152-54 and accompanying
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c. Typical Approach.-ProfessorNat Stern has pointed out that the involuntary public figure category might be circumscribed by restricting the
types of controversies into which a plaintiff may be drawn so as to render
that person an involuntary public figure.' Stern says that "the controversy
into which the plaintiffs have been drawn is not an abstract issue of public
policy; rather it implicates a concrete and serious threat to public health
and safety."'5 4 He adds that "the controversy will have been ignited by a
particular event that inflicts or threatens grave consequences."' 5 Stern
criticizes an approach that would limit involuntary public figure status to
cases in which there was a "nexus between the plaintiff's position and the
character of the defamation,"' 56 or, in other words, a requirement that the
plaintiff's position have invited comments like the alleged defamatory
statement. He explains that "insistence on even a moderate nexus between the plaintiff's position and the character of the defamation might
exclude someone like Rodney King ...[who] would seem to belong to any
category of involuntary figures that an equitable model might retain."'' 57
Some of the existing involuntary public figure cases may fit within
Stern's typal parameters. For example, in Wagstaffv. Morning Call, Inc.," 8
the court emphasized that the subject matter was a "brazen criminal act of
breathtaking proportion ... committed on the public streets,"' ' that con6°
cerned the safety of the community and the integrity of its banks.
d. PrimaryAssumption of Risk Analogy.-Professor Susan Gilles has attempted to explain the nature of the involuntary public figure classification

text.
153 See Nat Stern, UnresolvedAntitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUSTON
L. REV. 1027, 1o99 (1996).
154 Id. at io99.
155 Id.
iS6 Id. at i iOO.
dragged unwillingly into what by any
157 Id. Stern comments: "While King was literally
definition was a public controversy,there isnot even an attenuated link between King's flight
from pursuing police officers and a plausible expectation of incurring the scale and intensity
of attention that he ultimately received. Yet, King would seem to belong to any category of
involuntary figures that an equitable model might retain."
158 Wagstaff v. Morning Call, Inc., 41 Pa. D.&C. 4th 431 (Ct. C.P. Lehigh County 1999),
aff'd, 758 A.zd 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (discussed supra notes 139-47 and accompanying
text).
159 Id. at 442; see also Tomson v. Stephan, 699 E Supp. 86o (D. Kan. 1988) (plaintiff
who had settled sexual harassment lawsuit was not deemed a public figure with respect to
defendants' statements in press conference regarding the merits of the plaintiff's case). The
court reasoned that "the suit was hardly the type of controversy in which the public had a
strong vested interest, like the crash of a public carrier at our nation's capitol and a review of
an FAA program." Id. at 865-66.
i6o Wagstaff, 41 Pa. D.&C. 4th at 442.

2006- 20071

FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION LAW

by drawing upon traditional assumption of risk doctrine.161 She analogizes
the voluntary public figure classification to so-called secondary assumption
of risk while analogizing the involuntary public figure classification to primary assumption of risk. 6 ' She explains that:
[t]his is exactly the dividing line between primary and secondary assumption of risk: primary would apply if the plaintiff 'voluntarily' engaged in an
activity that has inherent risks of false publicity, even though the plaintiff
was 'involuntarily' dragged into the debate. In contrast, the secondary assumption would be triggered only if the plaintiff purposefully elected to
thrust herself into the debate.'63

Gilles's analogy is useful. Nevertheless, as she acknowledges, it leaves the
difficult, perhaps insoluble, problem of coming up with a sensible and workable test for deciding which situations warrant a primary assumption of risk
analysis when dealing with the involuntary public figure categorization. In
other words, there are difficulties in deciding when to limit the duty owed
to a defamation plaintiff irrespective of plaintiff's actual willingness to accept the risk of public scrutiny." 4 Gilles posits the following approach:
The Court could adopt a list of fact-based scenarios which would trigger primary assumption: for instance, engaging in activities that trigger a criminal
investigation; accepting a job on which the safety of a substantial segment
of the public depends; or filing a lawsuit. For these "activities" the Court
could hold the risks of publicity so well known that primary assumption is
triggered. For all others, secondary assumption could be required."'

16i See Susan M. Gilles, From BaseballParks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the Risk in

Tort Law and ConstitutionalLibel Law, 75 TEMPLE L.

REV. 231 (2002).

Primary and secondary

assumption of the risk are two forms of implied assumption of the risk. Id. at 234. Secondary
assumption of the risk refers to situations in which the plaintiff knows that the risk is present,
understands its nature, and freely and voluntarily chooses to incur it. See id. Secondary
assumption of the risk is a purely subjective inquiry. See id. at 234-35. Primary assumption of
the risk, on the other hand, is a question of duty. See id.at 235. This "doctrine embodies a legal
conclusion that there is no duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a
particular risk." See id. Primary assumption of the risk is used to "limit the duty the defendant
owes to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's voluntary decision to engage in an activity or
association." Id. The difference between primary and secondary assumption of the risk is that
"primary assumption of the risk does not require proof of either subjective knowledge and
appreciation of the risk by the plaintiff or actual consent to that risk; merely engaging in the
activity is sufficient to trigger assumption." Id. at 236.
162 Id. at 245-48.
163 Id. at z66.
164 Gilles, supra note 161, at 267-68.
I65 Id. at 268 (footnotes omitted). Gilles apparently recognizes, however, that the
mere fact that one engages in criminal conduct may not ipso facto transform the actor into a
public figure. See id. n.239 (citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979)
(rejecting the "contention of respondents that any person who engages in criminal conduct
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A case perhaps illustrating what Gilles may have had in mind is Erdmann v. SFBroadcastingof Green Bay, Inc.'66 A teenage "victim" reported that a
masked man had shot him after asking for his sister. 167 Attention turned to
the plaintiff, about whom complaints had been made that he was stalking
the "shooting victim's" sister.168 The plaintiff was subsequently arrested,
and a report of the events was aired on the defendant's newscast.'69 The
following day, the supposed shooting victim confessed that he had shot
himself and made up the story about the masked shooter. 170In holding that
the plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, the court reasoned:
[The plaintiff's] possession of automatic weapons, his "survivalist" inclinations, his stalking history, and his unknown whereabouts were all more than
mere allegations of criminal conduct and raised an issue of public concern.

The thrust of Erdmann's contention that he is not a limited purpose public
figure seems to flow from his contention that he did nothing to place himself in the public controversy ...Unfortunately, Erdmann was thrust into
this public controversy primarily because of the sixteen-year-old boy's false
report of being shot by a masked gunman. From this, and other information
gained from the purported victim's family, the police concluded that Erdmann was the assailant, that he was violent, that he had access to automatic
weapons and that he was dangerous. Although police formulated these conclusions without any conduct or action by Erdmann, it is clear that "it may
be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful
action of his own."
...[W]e can find no support for Erdmann's claim that limited figure public
status cannot be created without purposeful or voluntary conduct by the
71
individual involved.
Gilles's approach would seem to require that the plaintiff have consciously undertaken activities in which the risks of publicity were so well
known as to be inherent. The problem with Gilles's model is that it falls
short of the kind of straightforward vindication of First Amendment interests that is essential. It does so by preserving significant control by potential
plaintiffs over their status and thus over the level of threat of defamation
automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues
relating to his conviction")).
I66 Erdmann v.SF Broad. of Green Bay, Inc., 599 N.W.2d i(Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
167 See id.at 3.
I68 See id.

169 See id. at 3-4.
170 Id. at4.
171 Id. at 6-7 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
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claims posed to the freedom of others to communicate about their activities. In doing so, it concomitantly abides continuing enervation of freedom
of expression.
e. The Wells Compromise.-The most evolved judicial attempt to define
the involuntary public figure subcategory in a way that embraces both a
status-based and content-based analysis is found in Wells v. Liddy.7 2 The
plaintiff was a former secretary at the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) headquarters at the time of the Watergate burglary. She sued Gordon Liddy, one of the accused Watergate conspirators, for defamation. She
alleged that Liddy made statements theorizing that the purpose of the
break-in was to determine whether the democrats possessed information
embarrassing to then-legal counsel to the president, John Dean, specifically, whether photographs of his fiancd were located in the plaintiff's desk
among several photographs used to offer prostitution services.173 The plaintiff contended that Liddy's statements falsely suggested that she had acted
as a procurer of prostitutes for men who visited the DNC. 174
The district court, relying on Dameron, determined that the plaintiff
was an involuntary public figure because she had the "misfortune"' 75 of
'
having "been drawn by a series of events into the Watergate controversy."176
The court of appeals rejected the district court's analysis and held that the
plaintiff was not an involuntary public figure.177 The court reasoned that
"'misfortune' is only one of the considerations that should be weighed before concluding that an individual is an involuntary public figure.""17 The
court emphasized that it was "hesitant to rest involuntary public figure status on 'sheer bad luck"' alone.'79
The court of appeals acknowledged that some commentators have
questioned the continuing vitality of the involuntary public figure subcategory180 and that it had never "explored the parameters of the involuntary
'
In developing its own analysis,
branch of the public figure typography."181

172 Wells v. Liddy, 186 F3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 588
S.E.zd 197, 2o8 (W. Va. 2003) (referring to Wells as "[tihe leading case to explore the contours
of the involuntary public figure doctrine").
173 See Wells, 186 F3d at 512.
174 Id. at 518.
175 Wells v. Liddy, i F. Supp. 2d 532, 540 (D. Md. 1998) (granting summary judgment to
the defendant), rev'd, 186 E3d 505 ( 4 th Cir. 1999).

176 Id. at 54 1.

177 See Wells, 186 F3d at 538-42.
178 Id.at 538.
179 Id.
i8o Id. (noting that some authorities have questioned the continuing vitality of the
involuntary public figure).
181 Id.
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the court rejected the Dameron approach."' 2 The court declined to find it
alone sufficient for the involuntary public figure status that a person had
become the focus of media through "misfortune,"' 83 "sheer bad luck,"'"
or "happenstance.""18 The court's analysis drew generally upon the rationales in Gertz for drawing the line separating public and private figures:
1) whether the plaintiff had access to media and channels of communication for self-help in responding to potential defamation,'16 and 2) whether
the plaintiff "voluntarily assumed the risk of publicity."' 7 The court also
emphasized Gertz's restrictive description of the involuntary public figure
subcategory as "exceedingly rare." 88
The court then adopted the following test for involuntary public figure
status. First, the plaintiff must have been a centralfigurein a significant public controversy,189 which requires that the defendant "put forth evidence
that the plaintiff has been the regular focus of media reports on the controversy."' 9 Second, the plaintiff must have engaged in publiity-accepting
conduct, or as the court says, must have assumed the risk of publicity. 9'
Thus, for involuntary public figure status, the focus was not on whether the
182 Id. at 539. (stating that "[b]ecause Dameron has not narrowly tailored the class of
possible involuntary public figures, it has created a class of individuals who must prove actual
malice that is equivalent to the class in Rosenbloom. Under either Dameron or Rosenbloom all
individuals defamed during discourse on a matter of public concern must prove actual malice.
In light of the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of Rosenbloom, we are unwilling to adopt an
approach that returns us to an analysis that is indistinguishable." (citation omitted))
183 Id. at 538 (stating that misfortune is merely one aspect if the relevant
considerations).
184 Id. (stating that "[wie are hesitant to rest involuntary public figure status upon 'sheer
bad luck."')
185 Id. at 540 (stating that its "test excludes from the category of involuntary public
figures those individuals who by happenstance have been mentioned peripherally in a matter
of public interest or have merely been named in a press account").
186 Id. at 539 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,344 (1974)).
187 Id. (citing Gemiz, 418 U.S. at 344).
188 Id. (citing Gem-z, 418 U.S. at 345). The court stressed the "need for a narrow class of
involuntary public figures." Id.
189 Id. at 539-40.
19o Id. at 540. The court defined a significant public controversy as "one that touches
upon serious issues relating to, for example, community values, historical events, governmental
or political activity, arts, education, or public safety." Id.
191 Id. The Court stated:
[Allthough an involuntary public figure need not have sought
to publicize her views on the relevant controversy, she must have
nonetheless assumed the risk of publicity. Therefore, the defendant
must demonstrate that the plaintiff has taken some action, or failed to
act when action was required, in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would understand that publicity would likely inhere.
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plaintiff was seeking to influence the "outcome of debate on the matter,""'2
but on whether plaintiff's path implied his acquiescence in or acceptance
of the publicity. "'

A number of cases have voiced support for the Wells test,"9 and a few
earlier ones seem to have anticipated the Wells analysis.'95 In Wilson v. Daily
192 Id. ("Unlike the limited-purpose public figure, an involuntary public figure need not
have specifically taken action through which he has voluntarily sought a primary role in the
controversy to influence the outcome of debate on the matter.")
193 See id. at 539-40. The court further required that "the controversy must have existed
"prior to the publication of the defamatory statement; and ...[that] the plaintiff retained
public-figure status at the time of the alleged defamation." Id. at 540. The court added that its
involuntary public figure analysis must also accommodate the plaintiff's interest in attempting
self-help and thus should not be based on plaintiff's conduct in making a "reasonable response
to reputation-injuring statements." Id. at 537. In that vein, the court also said that where "an
involuntary public figure attempts self-help, the Foretich rule must apply with equal strength."
Id. at 540. The Foretich rule says that a private person "cannot be deemed a 'limited purpose
public figure' merely because he or she makes reasonable public replies to those accusations."
Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 E3d 1541, 1558 (4th Cir.1994) (footnote omitted).
194 See New Life Ctr., Inc. v. Fessio, 229 F.3d 1143, at **3 (4 th Cir. 2000) (Table); Dedefo
v. Wake, No. C2-02-1692, 2003 WL 2121983o, at *3(Minn. Ct. App. May 27, 2003); Wilson v.
Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, zo8 (W. Va. 2003).
195 See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.d 1072, 1o83 (3d Cir. 1985)
(stating that "the plaintiff's action may itself invite comment and attention, and even though
he does not directly try or even want to attract the public's attention, he is deemed to have
assumed the risk of such attention," and that "courts have classified some people as limited
purpose public figures because of their status, position or associations," and that "[i]f a position
itself is so prominent that its occupant unavoidably enters the limelight, then a person who
voluntarily assumes such a position may be presumed to have accepted public figure status");
Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.zd 562, 569-70 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that the
plaintiffwas a public figure because he had assumed "a role of public prominence with respect
to a matter of public concern"); cf. Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., 687 N.Y.S.zd
64 (N.Y. App. Div. 199o) (citing Dameron, with little analysis, but seeming to support a Wells
"goes with the territory" analysis by holding that an art restorer who used a controversial
restoration technique was an involuntary public figure for purposes of his restoration of a
valuable painting for a Dutch museum).

In Dombey, the plaintiff sued for allegedly defamatory newspaper articles that he had
engaged in improprieties while serving as the insurance agent of record for Maricopia County.
Dombey, 724 P.zd at 563. The court expressly disclaimed any reliance on a claim that the
plaintiff was an involuntary public figure. Id. at 567. But, then the court looked to the
expectations of the plaintiff in an analysis similar to Wells. The court reasoned:
By assuming the position that he held, Dombey invited public
scrutiny and should have expected that the manner in which he
performed his duties would be a legitimate matter of public concern,
exposing him to public and media attention ....
be drawn ....

[N]o bright line can

. . . Dombey entered into a continuing relationship with the
government and could be expected to receive the scrutiny that eventually
attends upon all major governmental efforts. Dombey cannot complain
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Gazette Co., 19 6 a high school athlete was the subject of a newspaper report
repeating a rumor that he had exposed himself after a basketball game.197
The court held that the plaintiff was not an involuntary public figure, and
expressly applied the Wells test.1 9 Specifically, the court required that:
(1) the plaintiff have become a central figure in a significant public controversy, (2) that the allegedly defamatory statement has arisen in the course of
discourse regarding the matter, and 3) the plaintiff has taken some action or
failed to act when action was required, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would understand that publicity would likely inhere." 9
f. Family Members andAcquaintances of PublicFiguresas Involuntary PublicFigures.-Anumber of courts have found that some family members and
acquaintances of public officials or figures may be at least limited purpose
public figures." ° Most of the cases addressing the question of whether a
relative or acquaintance of an established public person is a public figure
are devoid of meaningful analysis. Thus in the Zupnick case, for example,
the court held that the wife of a doctor embroiled in claims of overbilling
and professional negligence became a public figure when "Dr. Zupnick's

that the spotlight eventually turned on him; its unwelcome glare was a
matter of time, not surprise. We conclude, therefore, that Dombey was a
limited purpose public figure as to the county insurance programs.

Id.at 570-71; see infra notes

210-15 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
Dombey.
196 Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 2003).
197 See id. at 200.
198 See id.at 2o8-o9.
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F2d io6i, 1O66 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978) (holding that natural children of accused Soviet spies were public figures, and
stating that "(iun the course of extensive public debate revolving about the Rosenberg Trial
[their children] were cast into the limelight and became public figures"); Carson v. Allied
News Company, 529 Ezd 2o6, 210 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating, after the plaintiffs, entertainer
Johnny Carson and his second wife conceded that they were public figures, that "one can
assume that the wife of a public figure such as Carson more or less automatically becomes at
least a part-time public figure herself"); Zupnick v. Associated Press, Inc., 31 E Supp. zd 70,
72 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that wife of the doctor embroiled in claims of overbilling and
professional negligence who was also sued for allegedly conspiring with her husband in a
fraudulent conveyance of property for the purposes of hiding assets from potential creditors
was an involuntary public figure, and noting that "[dlespite the fact that the plaintiff has
not sought a public role, she had been thrust into the role of a public figure by virtue of her
marriage to Dr. Zupnik" and intense public interest surrounding her husband, and her alleged
conspiring in a fraudulent conveyance, "transformed her into an involuntary figure"); Scaccia
v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., Nos. 18435, 18729, 2001 WL 1517043, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
30, zoo) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff is married to a public official bolsters her
public-figure status."
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notoriety spilled over upon the plaintiff and drew her into the public spot2
light." 01
Some courts have taken a cautious approach on the sufficiency of a relationship as a basis for limited purpose public figure status. In Naantaanbuu
v. Abernathy,"'2 the female plaintiff, at whose home Martin Luther King Jr.
had eaten dinner the evening before his assassination, was not deemed a
public figure. Her defamation claim was based on a report in a biography
implying that she and Dr. King had engaged in an extramarital affair that
evening. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff's connection with
03
King was "too fleeting for her to be an involuntary public figure." The
court noted that the plaintiff in Dameron by contrast occupied a "central
role" in the public controversy.1°4

g. Khawar's "Access" Test.-In Khawar v. Globe International,Inc.,"'s the
defendant published a photo with an arrow pointing at the plaintiff indicat0 6
The court held
ing that he was the assassin of Senator Robert Kennedy.1
that the plaintiff, a Pakistani citizen and freelance photo journalist on assignment for a Pakistani periodical who stood on the podium near Robert
Kennedy before Kennedy left the room and was shot in the hotel pantry
area, was not an involuntary public figure. 07 The court recognized the involuntary public figure category in principle, but explained:
By stating that it is theoretically possible to become a public figure without
purposeful action inviting criticism . . . , the high court has indicated that
purposeful activity may not be essential for public figure characterization.
But the high court has never stated or implied that it would be proper for a
court to characterize an individual as a public figure in the face of proof that
the individual had neither engaged in purposeful activity inviting criticism
nor acquired substantial media access in relation to the controversy at issue.
We read the court's decisions as precluding courts from affixing the public
figure label when neither of the reasons for applying that label has been
demonstrated. Thus, assuming a person may ever be accurately characterized as an involuntary public figure, we infer from the logic of Gertz that the
high court would reserve this characterization for an individual who, despite
never having voluntarilyengaged the public's attention in an attempt to influence the outcome of a public controversy, nonetheless has acquired such

201 Zupnik, 31 E Supp.

zd at 73.

E Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 223 n.2.
Id. (noting also that the plaintiff in the instant case "has gone some twenty-five years
being pulled into the controversy over what happened that night").
Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998).
See id.at 699.

202 Naantaanbuu v. Abernathy, 816
203

204

without
205
206

207 See id. at 702-04.
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public prominence in relation to the controversy as to permit media access
°
sufficient to effectively counter media-published defamatory statements.2
Thus, the Khawarcourt contemplated that, in order to become an involuntary public figure, at the very least the person must either have "engaged in
purposeful activity inviting criticism" or have "acquired substantial media
access in relation to the controversy at issue."' 2°0
h. Stealth Involuntary Public FigureApplications.-In some cases there
is a marked disjunction between the courts' disavowal of reliance on the
involuntary public figure classification (or at least disinclination to invoke
it) and what the courts seem to actually do. Thus, in Dombey v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 10 the plaintiff sued for allegedly defamatory newspaper
articles suggesting that he had engaged in improprieties while serving as
the county's insurance agent of record. 2 1l The court expressly disclaimed
any reliance on a claim that the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure,
and even cast doubt on that category's continued existence."' l Nonetheless,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff, "[bly assuming the position that he
held.... invited public scrutiny and should have expected that the manner
in which he performed his duties would be of legitimate matter of public
concern, exposing him to public and media attention." 1 3 The court then
stated in a conclusory manner that "[w]hatever requirement there might be
to 'thrust' oneself into a public controversy was satisfied by his voluntary
participation in activity calculated to lead to public scrutiny.' z 4 Casting further doubt on its disclaimer of reliance on the involuntary figure category,
the court cited the Dameron case, 1 ' the poster child of the broad involuntary public figure classification.
The tendency of courts to disavow the involuntary public figure classification while partly relying on it is evident in other cases." 6 Of particular
2o8 Id. at 702.
Id.
21o Dombey v.Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986).
209

Seeid. at 563.
See id.at 567 ("aside from its articulation in Gertz, it [the involuntary public status] has
never been applied by the Supreme Court and may have been abandoned .... Accordingly,
we do not rely on that doctrine for resolution of this case."
213 Id. at 570.
214 Id. at 571.
215 Id. at 571 (citing Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
216 SeeClyburn v. News World Commc'ns, Inc., 903 E2d 29,33 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (plaintiff
held to be limited public figure in part because of numerous contacts with D.C. government
officials); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 E2d 1072, 1084 n.9 (3d Cir.
1985) ("[R]ather than creating a separate class of public figures, we view [the involuntary
public figure] description as merely one way an individual may come to be considered a
211

212
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noteworthiness is Lohrenz v. Donnelly.'1 7 The plaintiff was one of the first
two female naval officers trained and assigned to fly the Navy F-14 fighter;
the other was killed while crash-landing an F-14 on the U.S.S. Abraham
Lincoln."'8 Plaintiff sued defendants Elaine Donnelly and the Center for
Military Readiness"1 9 for defamation based on alleged statements in a report suggesting "that female and male naval aviators were treated differently in that female aviators were promoted on a lower standard and received special concessions.... and that plaintiff was one pilot who received
special treatment which permitted her to advance." 2 0
The district court in Lohrenz, seemed to straddle both the voluntary and
involuntary subcategories of the limited public figure classification, finally
stating that the plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure "albeit possibly involuntary[ily]. '' 1 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also
found that the plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, but it professed
to decide the matter exclusively on a voluntary public figure basis. The
court reasoned:
chose the F-14 combat jet while well aware of the
Because [the plaintiff] ...
public controversy over women in combat roles, her challenge to the ruling
that she was a voluntary limited-purpose public figure once the Navy assigned her to the F-14 combat aircraft rings hollow: she chose combat training in the F-14 and when, as a result of that choice, she became one of the
first two women combat pilots, a central role in the public controversy came
general or limited purpose public figure."); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 Fzd 859,
861 (5th Cir. 1978) ("status of public figure Vel non does not depend upon the desires of an
individual"); Ellis v. Time, Inc., No. Civ. A.94-1755, 1997 WL 863267, at *1,*6 (D.D.C. Nov.
i8,1997) (noting that even though the plaintiff may not have intended to become a public
figure, he became one because he "voluntarily exposed [himself] to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood" by entering into the public controversy).
In Ellis, the plaintiff was a photo journalist who posted messages in an online discussion
group, claiming that photos featured in a magazine story were faked. Id. at *i. Thereafter,
the plaintiff himself was accused of attempting to bribe one of the persons depicted in the
photographs to corroborate that the photos were staged. Id. *2. The court held that the
plaintiff was a voluntary limited purpose public figure. Id. at *6. It noted that the plaintiff
had initiated debate by posting a lengthy message on the internet, and in meeting with the
person depicted in the photograph. Id. Interestingly, after stating that the plaintiff "thrust
himself into the controversy," the court immediately seemed to imply that the plaintiff did not
desire to become a public figure. Id. The court said pointedly that while perhaps the plaintiff
"'underestimate[d] the power of computer forums' [,] ...[nievertheless, his message and his
views became public." Id.
217 Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F3d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. zoo3).
z18 Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F.Supp.zd 25, 30 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 350 F3d
1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
219 CMR was "a public policy organization concerned with military personnel issues."
Id. at 30.
220

Id. at 32.

221

Id. at44.
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with the territory. Having assumed the risk when she chose combat jets
that she would in fact receive a combat assignment, Lt. Lohrenz attained a
position of special prominence in the controversy when she "suited up" as
an F-14 combat pilot. 221
In deciding that the plaintiff was a voluntary limited purpose public figure,
the court of appeals expressly declined to address either the plaintiff's status under an involuntary public figure analysis or whether the Dameroncase
should be reconsidered."2 3 The court also resisted invoking the involuntary
public figure subcategory despite the plaintiff's assiduous efforts to pigeonhole the defendant's public figure argument into that category.114 The court
summarily responded that the plaintiff's focus was misplaced because the
evidence showed that "Lt. Lohrenz was a voluntary limited-purpose public
figure." '
In its voluntary public figure analysis, the court articulated a "special
prominence" inquiry requiring that "[tihe plaintiff must either have been
purposefully trying to influence the outcome or could realistically have
been expected, because of his position in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution."'2 6 But, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a
voluntary public figure based on conduct that seemed dissimilar from that
2 22
of the classical voluntary public figure who thrusts herself into the fray of
a public controversy 2 8 The court stated:

Lohrenz, 35o E3d at 1274.
Id.at 1274, 1278.
224 Id. at 1278. Indeed, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff devoted "precious
little of the argument in her brief" to the voluntary limited-purpose public figure doctrine,
nor did she challenge the appropriateness in principle of the analysis of that doctrine based on
the Waldbaum case. Id. "Rather [the plaintiff] focus[ed primarily] on the involuntary public
figure analysis in [Dameron]. Id.The plaintiff contended that on the merits she could not be a
voluntary public figure because "she had not 'thrust' herself" into a public controversy. Id.
225 Id. (emphasis added).
226 Id. at 128o (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 Ezd 1287, 1297 (D.C.
Cit. 198o).
227 Typically, a voluntary limited purpose public figure will "have thrust themselves to
the front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved." Gertz v.Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345 (1974).
o
228 See SMOLLA, supra note 92, § 2:35.5 . Dean Smolla states:
222

223

[Allthough the Court of Appeals in Lohrenz did argue that Lohrenz
had "volunteered" for public figure status, her voluntariness was not the
usual kind of voluntariness found in public figure cases. The Court of
Appeals conceded that Lohrenz had not volunteered entry into a public
debate to influence its outcome; or volunteered for media attention, or
volunteered in for anything other than suiting up to fly combat jets at
a time when the role of women in the military was controversial. For
the Court of Appeals to insist that it was not engaging Dameron and the
involuntary public figure doctrine was thus not entirely persuasive. For
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Although, as we understand Lohrenz's position on appeal, it was the Navy,
not she, that placed her at the center of the controversy about women as
combat pilots, the evidence ... does not support her position. Lohrenz not
only alleged that she "chose to be trained in combat aviation," ... her actions and statements belie any basis on which to conclude that she did not
voluntarily seek to be in the combat pilot position to which the Navy assigned her. Once she "chose ...combat aviation" by indicating her preference for the F-14 while knowing of the preexisting public controversy over
the appropriateness of women in combat positions, Lt. Lohrenz assumed
the risk that if she succeeded in qualifying for a combat assignment and the
Navy made such an assignment, she would find herself at the center of the
controversy as a result of the special prominence that she and only one other
woman combat pilot attained upon receiving their F-14 assignments. That
Lt. Lohrenz might have preferred a combat assignment that did not place
her in the center of the public controversy is legally irrelevant.
[Alt the point she "suited up" as an F-14 pilot . .. she assumed the
risk that she would attain such an assignment, which, in light of the public
controversy, meant she would be in a position of special prominence in that
controversy ....[Sihe is a voluntary public figure .... 129
...

The court of appeals concluded with the following remark: "Lt. Lohrenz
was confronted with the choice of piloting a supersonic combat fighter jet
as a voluntary public figure, or giving up her dream of being a Navy pilot
in order to remain a private figure."130 The court's analysis shows the difficulty of separating status and content, and it highlights the hopeless artificiality and subjectiveness of the determination of whether a person has
morphed into a voluntary public figure, or when (or even whether) a person
may be deemed an involuntary public figure. The court seems in reality to
have converted voluntariness into a sort of vague assumption-of-the-riskof-publicity test. 3 ' Not far beneath the surface is the true driving force
behind the court's analysis (and the involuntary public figure subcategory
in holding that a woman because she was a woman took on public figure
status merely for volunteering for combat jets at time in our history when
such roles were controversial for women was to stretch the concept of
"volunteering" to the point at which it became essentially involuntary
volunteering. If what Lohrenz did counts as volunteering for public
figure status, then the requirement of voluntary entry into the public
arena becomes little more than a play on words.
229 Lohrenz, 350 F3d at 128o-82. The court added that, "although Waldbaum 'provides us
with useful analytic tools[,] nevertheless, the touchstone remains [the standard the Supreme
Court set forth for classifying an individual as a public figure, namely] whether an individual
has 'assumed [a] role[ I of especial prominence in the affairs of society .. .[that] invite[s]
attention and comment."' Id. at 1279 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
230
231

Id. at I282.
The court emphasized the assumption of risk underpinnings of its holding repeatedly.

See id.at 1281-82.
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that the court skirted): a concern about the public's interest in free debate
respecting matters which are deemed newsworthy.
Take, for example, the case of Clyburn v. News World Communications,
Inc. 32 The plaintiff's defamation claim was based on statements by the defendant publisher's newspaper describing the death of plaintiff's girlfriend
from possible drug overdose and "depict[ing] .

.

.plaintiff ...as waiting

'several critical hours' after [her] collapse to call for help, in order to allow
other partygoers to leave the scene." '33 In finding that the plaintiff was a
voluntary limited purpose public figure, the court noted:
Clyburn denies that he injected himself into the public controversy at all

...We view this cover-up attempt as going beyond an ordinary citizen's
response to the eruption of a public fray around him ....
More important, Clyburn's acts before any controversy arose put him at its
center. His consulting firm had numerous contracts with the District government, he had many social contacts with administration officials, and Medina, at least as one may judge from attendance at her funeral, also enjoyed
such ties. Clyburn also spent the night of Medina's collapse in her company.
One may hobnob with high officials without becoming a public figure, but
one who does so runs the risk that personal tragedies that for less well-connected people would pass unnoticed may place him at the heart of a public
controversy. Clyburn engaged in conduct that he knew markedly raisedthe
chances that he would become embroiled in a public controversy. This conduct, together with his false statements at the controversy's outset, disable
him from claiming the protections of a purely "private" person z34
Thus, although some cases may speak in terms of voluntary public figure status,
their underlying analysis, with its emphasis on "run[ning] the
"risks" 3 ' and "rais[ing] the chances"136 of becoming a news item or engaging in activities that "most require public scrutiny,"137 gravitates toward an
involuntary public figure analysis.
Some cases almost seem to deliberately blur the line between the voluntary and involuntary public figure categories. For example, in Marcone v.
PenthouseInternationalMagazinefor Men, the court found that the plaintiff

232

Clyburn v. News World Commc'ns, Inc., 903 F.zd 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 199o).

233
234
235
236

Id. at 30.
Id. at32-33 (emphasis added).
Id. at 33.
Id.

237 Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, io86 (3d Cir. 1985).
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was a limited purpose public figure.138 In reaching that conclusion, the court
noted that the plaintiff had attained notoriety for representing members of
two motorcycle gangs, for having been indicted himself for conspiracy to
distribute marijuana (which was subsequently withdrawn by the government), and for having non-representational contacts with the motorcycle
gangs. 39 Commenting on the involuntary public figure subcategory, the
court said:
Some courts and commentators have questioned whether Getz also created a third class of public figures: the involuntary public figure .... In
general, rather than creating a separate class of public figures, we view such
a description as merely one way an individual may come to be considered
a general or limited purpose public figure. Thus, to the extent a person attains public figure status by position, status, or notorious act he might be
considered an involuntary public figure.14°
The court added that "if [the plaintiffs] actions are sufficient to transform
him into a limited public figure, it is of no moment that Marcone did not
desire such status.""'' Then the court reasoned that the "purpose of the
first amendment would be frustrated if those persons and activities that
most require public scrutiny could wrap themselves in a veil of secrecy and
4
thus remain beyond the reach of public knowledge."1
i. DecisionAvoidance.-Some courts, almost with a sigh of relief, assiduously avoid deciding the question of the scope of the involuntary public
figure subcategory. For example, in Flowers v. Carville,143 the court found
that Jennifer Flowers was a voluntary public figure with respect to the controversy over alleged statements that tape-recordings with President Clinton were "doctored" or "selectively edited."2" The court then remarked

238 Id.
239 Id. at 1076.
240
241

Id. at 1o84 n.9.
Id. at io86.

242 Id.; see also Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In our
view of the law resulting from the inevitable collision between First Amendment freedoms
and the right of privacy, the status of public figure Vel non does not depend upon the desires
of an individual. The purpose served by limited protection to the publisher of comment
upon a public figure would often be frustrated if the subject of the publication could choose
whether or not he would be a public figure.").
243 Flowers v. Carville, 31o E3d 118, 1129 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Deupree v. Iliff,
860 F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Although Deupree 'played a[n] ... involuntary[] role,'...
we need not decide whether she falls within that class of individuals who ...[are] drawn into
a particular controversy," thereby becoming limited-purpose public figures.).
244 Flowers, 3oE3dat 1127, Iz9.
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that "[we can therefore stay clear of the intercircuit conflict over purely
involuntary public figures." '45
3. Dun & Bradstreet: Overt Reemergence of Content-Based Limitations.-In
Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,z46 the Supreme Court concluded that the second core holding of Ger-"that a [sitate could not allow
recovery of presumed and punitive damages [in defamation cases] absent
a showing of 'actual malice' 2'' 47 (knowledge or reckless disregard)--did not
apply unless the allegedly defamatory statement involved a matter of public concern. 48 The Court narrowly interpreted Gertz, saying that nothing in
that opinion "indicated that this same balance would be struck regardless
of the type of speech involved." 49 The result was the sudden surfacing of a
content-based dimension that had until then lurked occultly in the analytical crawl spaces beneath the status-of-the-plaintiff rule. Although technically Dun &Bradstreetaddressed only the second core holding of Gertz, s0 its
245 Id. at 1129 n.7 (citing the Dameron and Wells cases, which are discussed supra Parts
II.B. subparts 2b and 2e, to illustrate the conflict).
246 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (I985).
247 Id. at 756.

248 Id. at 763. Although Justice Powell was joined by only two other justices (Rehnquist
and O'Connor, JJ.) in his opinion, his rule still represented the majority of the Court because
two additional justices, ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White, brought support for the Powell
position to five. Recall from their dissenting opinions in Germithat Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White disapproved of Getrm and preferred a position reducing the scope of First
Amendment limitations. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 48 U.S. 323, 355, 370 (974) (Burger,
C.J., and White, J., dissenting)).
249 Dun &Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756-57. The Court elaborated:
We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when
the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern. To make
this determination, we must employ the approach approved in Gertz
and balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals
for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in
protecting this type of expression ....
... We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance. It is speech on "'matters of public concern"'
that is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."
Id. at 756-57 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
o
25 The Court's language was ambiguous and vacillating. Initially, Justice Brennan stated
the question as "whether this rule of Gemt- applies when the false and defamatory statements
do not involve matters of public concern." Id. at 75 1. But, later in his opinion, Justice Brennan
seemed to invite a broader reading of the Court's analysis, one that would require a finding of
a matter of public concern before either of the Get restrictions applied. Id. at 757 Here, he
referred to the question broadly as "whether the Gert balance obtains when the defamatory
statements involve no issue of public concern." Id. Ultimately, Justice Brennan returned
to a narrow scope, stating: "we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of
presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of 'actual malice."' Id. at 761. In
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matter-of-public-concern qualification probably narrows the scope of both
holdings of Gertz, including the requirement of at least some level of fault
in claims by private plaintiffs,"5 ' although it remains unclear."' 2

a footnote to this holding, however, Justice Brennan again paints more broadly, saying "what
the Germ language indicates is that the State's interest is not substantial relative to the First
Amendment interest in public speech." Id. at 761 n.7. This latter language may imply that no
constitutional restrictions on defamation apply "on purely private matters." Id.
251 See Deeann M. Taylor, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps and Milkovich: The Lingering
Confusion in Defamation Law, 1992/1993ANN.SuRv.AM.L. 153,175-76 (1993) (noting the concern
that Dun & Bradstreet "could be interpreted to mean that none of the fault requirements in
Gertz apply when the plaintiff is a private figure and/or the speech does not implicate matters
of public concern"); see also id. at 176 (stating that "[tiaken together, the Court's decisions in
both Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps suggest that a content-based test may become the dividing
line between constitutional protection and common law rules").
The Court in Dun & Bradstreet did not expressly spell out whether its "matter of public
concern" requirement applied to both of the core First Amendment-based limitations
adopted in Germ, or only to the second one-related to presumed and punitive damages. Dun
&Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761. The Court's language in subsequent cases seems to support
construing Dun & Bradstreet broadly as leaving all defamation rules up to states when not
dealing with matters of public concern. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. I, 20-21
(1990) ("[Wihere a statement of "opinion" on a matter of public concern reasonably implies
false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show
that such statements were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless
disregard of their truth ....[Wlhere such a statement involves a private figure on a matter of
public concern, a plaintiff must show that the false connotations were made with some level of
fault as required by Gerft." (footnote omitted)); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 768-69,774 (1986) (hedging at first, saying "we hold that, at least where a newspaper
publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without
also showing that the statements at issue are false[,]" but then stating that "[wihen the speech
is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure .. .the constitutional
requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the
common-law landscape"); see also Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 E2d 1188, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1989) (stating that "[m]ore recently, in Dun & Bradstreet ...a majority of the Justices
opined that defamatory statements of untrue fact contained in private figure/private concern
speech are unprotected by the first amendment"); Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 Ezd 593,595
(4th Cir. 1985) ("[A] majority of the [Dun & Bradstreet] Court ruled that the principles of New
York Times and Germa had no application where the speech concerned no public issue but was
speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and was on a matter of purely private
concern."); Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 606 S.E.zd 734, 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(interpreting Dun & Bradstreet as holding that "where the plaintiff is a private figure, and the
speech at issue is of private concern, a state court is free to apply its governing common law
without implicating First Amendment concerns") (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763).
One court even held that liability could be imposed for defamatory statements uttered with
common-law malice rather than actual malice if the statement did not involve public officials,
public figures, or matters of public concern. See Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1215-16,
izi6 n.i (R.I. 1995) (stating in dicta-since the "defendant [had] not preserved the federal
constitutional issues"-that the constitutional limitation was "not applicable to the case at
bar because we are not dealing with public officials, public figures, or even matters of public
concern.").

252 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 774-75 (stating that it remains an open question whether
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In its overt introduction of a content-based, matter-of-public-concern
requirement as an integral part of the constitutional matrix in Dun & Bradstreet, the Court ignored the fact that Gertz had assiduously repudiated a
content-based approach. Recall Gertz's rejection of the Rosenbloom plurality
with the following erstwhile language admonishing against a case-by-case,
content-driven approach:
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the press and
the individual's claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck
on a case-by-case basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might seem,
purely as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be
to scrutinize carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First
Amendment values transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the
particular plaintiff who prevailed .... " But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty
to supervise the lower courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution
of the competing interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we
must lay down broad rules of general application ....

...And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
"general or public interest" and which do not-to .... We doubt the wisdom
2 3
of committing this task to the conscience of judges. 1
The Dun andBradstreetcase not only resurrected a content-based test, but
crucially raised the stakes of a determination of the absence of a matter of
public concern. Instead of applying the matter-of-public-concern inquiry
as a threshold for imposing the requirement of a finding of knowledge or
reckless disregard (as proposed in Rosenbloom), Dun & Bradstreetemployed
the public concern inquiry as a threshold precondition for applying the
limitation on defamation contemplated in the second core holding of Gemtz.
Thus, under Dun &Bradstreet, the absence of a public concern meant that
not even the requirements of Gerz (or at least not some of them 4) would
apply to restrain state defamation law, which raises the specter of some
state attempting to apply strict liability in a defamation claim.
If one takes the Court's pre-Dun &Bradstreetlanguage at face value, the
constitutional limitations on defamation depended on a unitary test focused
Dun & Bradstrretmeans "that the states may now impose strict liability on defendants in
defamation actions in which private plaintiffs are complaining of speech not of public
concern").
253 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-46 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63
(Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted).
254 See supra note 2 16.
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exclusively on the status of the plaintiff. The Court's language in Gertz had
already expressly repudiated the content-based approach of Rosenbloom.
Other opinions by the Court had also referred to the rejection of a contentbased rule for defining constitutional limitations on defamation claims."' 5
But, that changed with Dun & Bradstreet.The new post-Dun & Bradstreet
reality was also evident in Hepps, where the Court took cognizance of "two
forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First
Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure,
or is instead a private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is
of public concern."' -6 The reality of Dun & Bradstreetis the overt re-emergence of content as a major driver in First Amendment defamation jurisprudence, which is also evident in a largely overlooked opinion by Justice
Brennan. In Lorain JournalCo. v. Milkovich,zs7 Justice Brennan dissented
from the decision of the Court to deny certiorari with respect to a decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court classifying a plaintiff as a private figure. He
wrote: "Our decisions in this area rest at bottom on the need to protect
58
public discussion about matters of legitimate public concern."
With the recrudescence of an overt content-based component came the
challenge of trying to figure out what should and should not be deemed a
matter of "public concern." The opinion in Dun & Bradstreet did little to
assuage concerns voiced in Gerz and elsewhere about the inherent amorphousness of the concept of "public concern." The Court began with a
boilerplate recitation that "[w]hether ... speech address[ed] a matter of

public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form,
and context ...

as revealed by the whole record."'"5 9 The Court then ad-

dressed the specific speech at issue (which was a credit report), and empha255 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,456 (1976) (stating that Gerz had eschewed
"a subject matter test for [on]e focusing upon the character of the defamation plaintiff"); Cox

Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 n.2 (1975) (referring to the Court's abandonment of
the "(matter) of 'general or public interest' standard as the determinative factor for deciding
whether to apply the New York Times [sic] malice standard to defamation litigation brought
by private individuals."); Lewis, supra note 12, at 768 (Gertz rejected the subject matter test).
256 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). The Court in
Hepps held that "at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a privatefigure plaintiff cannot recover without also showing that the statements at issue are false." Id.
at 768-69.
257 Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 953 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan, I.,
dissenting from decision to deny petition for certiorari). The Court eventually reviewed
the Ohio case on other grounds relating to First Amendment significance of the fact-opinion
dichotomy in defamation. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (199o) (holding
that "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a
provably false factual connotation" or that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts "will receive full constitutional protection").
258 Milkovich, 474 U.S. at 963.
259 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,761 (1985) (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
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sized that it "was speech solely in the interest of the speaker and its specific business audience" 6 ' and "was made available only to five subscribers,
2 6
who, under the terms of the agreement, could not disseminate it further." 1 '
The Court also noted that this type of speech was "hardy and unlikely to
be deterred by incidental state regulation,"1 61 that it was "more objectively
verifiable, 2 63 and that it was responsive to powerful market incentives to
be accurate."z The Court then virtually assured future courts would engage
in unpredictable adhoc analyses, saying that there was "simply no credible
argument that this type of credit reporting requires special protection to
ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust and wideopen.'"65
III.

THESIS

Tethering the scope of constitutionally mandated limitations on state defamation law to the status of the plaintiff and the content of the communication has been improvident. It is time to extend the scope of the beneficent
limitations announced in the New York Times and in several of its sequelae,
including Hepps and Milkovich, to all defamation claims irrespective of the
status of the plaintiff and the content of the speech. Accordingly, all plaintiffs in all defamation cases should be required-in addition to satisfying
the elements of applicable state law-to prove with convincing clarity that
the defendant published the alleged defamatory statements with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their potential falsity, that the
statements were untrue, and that the statements were provably false statements suggesting actual facts.
The premise that public figures have voluntarily accepted the risk of
defamation, or that it goes with the territory, is nothing more than a handy
fiction. The courts indulge in it to demonstrate that the First Amendment
is secure and that states' rights to protect the reputations of their citizens
(and the interests of those representing clients on both sides of this dance)
are respected. When it comes to constitutional rights, the shadowy gap between the conception and the reality is too often papered over by a reassuring legal bromide. Behind this Potemkin village lies a disjunction between
rights and obligations, with "rhetorical emphasis ... on the importance of
the right; the obligation is a byproduct, an after-thought .... 66And so it
26o Id. at 749-50.
261 Id. at750.
262 Id. at 762.
263 Id.
) 264 Id. at 762-63.
265 Id. at 762 (quoting New York Times Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
266 Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find
There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10, 23-24 (1995); see generally John C. Jeffries, The Right-
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is when it comes to discerning the contours of the limited purpose public
figure, a concept subject to widely divergent views. 67 The public figure
concept is also too amorphous and unpredictable to assuage the chill of
publishers.168 Not only is the voluntariness of public figures an ill-defined
and unpredictable fiction, but whether or not one happens to be deemed
a public figure should simply not control the scope of First Amendment
safeguards. If one then adds to this brew the vague possibility of involuntary public figures, the whole voluntary-goes-with-the-territory-if-youcan't-stand-the-heat idea becomes suspect.
What was said of the status-based analysis is also true for the content of
the speech analysis. The Court in Dun & Bradstreet embossed a new "matter of public concern" overlay onto the line marking the reach of at least
some First Amendment constitutional limitations on state defamation law.
This seems fundamentally dissonant with the underpinnings of the First
Amendment. The question of whether a statement relates to a matter of
public concern is fraught with uncertainty. First, the doctrinal reach of the
"public concern" prerequisite is unclear. Does it apply only to the Gertz
First Amendment limitations on presumed or punitive damages, or does
it also extend to the more fundamental requirement of plaintiff's proof of
69
fault and falsity in defamation?
Second, the range of plaintiffs to which the public concern requirement
applies is unclear. Does the requirement apply only to private plaintiffs,

remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1999) (discussing the "right-remedy
gap," and observing that "[tihe distance between the ideal and the real means that there will
always be some shortfall between the aspirations we call rights and the mechanisms we call
remedies").
267 Nichols, supra note 92, at at 76; see id. at 79 (noting the "widely divergent" views on
the meaning of the involuntary public figure references in Gertz).
268 See Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.zd 562 570 (Ariz. 1986) (noting that
"no bright line can be drawn."). Inconsistent results only add to a publisher's confusion about
how to interpret the public figure concept. For example, in the highly publicized defamation
litigation arising out of a custody dispute involving the daughter of two physicians, two
courts came out differently on the public figure issue. Compare Foretich v. Advance Magazine
Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. io99, iio8, iio9 (D.D.C. 1991) (grandmother in a highly
publicized child visitation dispute was, "[alt the very least" an involuntary limited purpose
public figure), with Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F3d 1541, 1551, 1558, 1563, 1564
(4 th Cir. 1994) (holding that grandmother's public comments and appearances in a custody
dispute were merely "reasonable public replies" to accusations of serious sexual misconduct
and were not sufficient to render her a limited-purpose public figure, and tacitly rejecting by
its silence, except for quoting Gert, classifying her as an involuntary public figure).
269 See supra notes 210-29 and accompanying text (discussing unresolved questions
about the scope of Dun & Bradstreet).
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or does it extend to all plaintiffs, public and private figures alike?70 The
Supreme Court has not offered much useful guidance here either.2 7'
Third, the Court has never offered meaningful direction for deciding
when a communication should or should not be deemed a matter of public
concern.27 2 In truth, the notion of public concern defies meaningful ob270 See Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants,PublicConcerns,andPublicPlaintiffs: Toward
Fashioning Orderfrom Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 UNIV. Prrr. L. REV. 91, 125 (1987)
("The question is whether, in cases involving public official or public figure plaintiffs, the
constitutional fault and proof of falsity rules previously imposed on such plaintiffs are to be
regarded as inapplicable if the defendant's statement did not deal with a matter of public
concern.") (footnote omitted). Professor Langvardt adds:

Of all the potential ramifications of the renewed public concern
focus exemplified by the Dun &Bradstreet and Hepps decisions, the most
troublesome is the prospect that the public concern-private concern
determination will be explicitly required, even in public plaintiff cases,
as one of the triggering factors in determining whether the plaintiff must
satisfy the constitutional proof of fault requirements.
Id. at 133.
Some have opined that it might not even be possible for there to exist communications
about public figures, without there being matters of public concern. See Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine Inc., 867 E2d 1188, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1989) ("we doubt that it is possible to have
speech about a public figure but not of public concern"); Taylor, supranote 25 1, at 179 (stating
that "it is doubtful whether it is possible to have speech about a public figure which is not also
of public concern" (footnote omitted)).
271 For example, New York Times seems to have left the door open to application of the
public concern threshold to public official when it qualified its holding as being applicable
to defamatory falsehoods "relating to [the] official conduct" of the public official. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (stating that "[t]he constitutional
guarantees require... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."). On the other hand, Hepps contains broadly sweeping language
that seemed to assume that the public concern requirement extended to all plaintiffs, public
and private. The Court stated: "[wihen the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a
much higher barrier before recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the
common law." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). Similarly,
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, S6 (1988), the Court articulated its holding
without mentioning a "matter of pubic concern" precondition to constitutional limitations
on liability:
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made
with 'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
Id.
272

See Langvardt, supra note 27o, at 126 (stating that the Court injected the public
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jectification. Given the inherent amorphousness of the Dun & Bradstreet
three factor "content, form and context" formulation, it should come as no
surprise that the Court never specified the relative weight of content, form,
and context.173 One writer has commented that "[t]his test amounts to little
more than an implied assertion by the plurality that no stated standards are
necessary to guide courts in making the public concern-private concern
determination, because judges will know a matter of public concern when
they see it."2' 7 4 Lower courts have dutifully recited the "content, form, and
context" catechism-ort of an obligatory "may I"-before proclaiming ipse
dixit that a statement was or was not a matter of public concern. 75
Fourth, the determination of whether the content of a statement will be
deemed to be a matter of public concern will necessitate a case-by-case determination. This not only entails an onerous burden for the courts, but it is
a dangerously subjective model. The current approach inevitably involves
a process and outcomes that are unpredictable and subjective. It invites
inconsistent results. 7 6Whether something is a matter of public concern is a
function of the current winds, which causes the determination to be fanned
in different directions by polycentric influences. The public concern question is inevitably time-bound and situational. Tying First Amendment protections to the ephemeral value perceptions of judges is fundamentally
at odds with the essence of the First Amendment. As Justice Hugo Black
noted, "[no suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom
there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the
timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression." '77

concern concept into the First Amendment matrix "without favoring lower courts and
attorneys with any detailed elaboration on what constitutes a public concern, . . a subject ...
left enshrouded in a fog of uncertainty" (footnote omitted)).
273 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 785.
274 Langvardt, supra note 27 o , at 126.
275 See, e.g., Flamm v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000)
(deciding that a selective directory of attorneys compiled by a non-profit was a matter of
public concern after stating this determination is made by examining the "content, form, and
context of [the] given statement.").
276 See Taylor, supra note 251, at 178 (noting "the reality that different judges will
interpret the same speech differently, thus creating a risk of inconsistent results," and that
"[aillowing judges alone to freely define 'public concern' invites them to make personal
judgments regarding the relative worth of speech ... creat[ing] the potential for the imposition
of different rules on different speakers despite seemingly similar situations").
277 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941). The language is in keeping with
Justice Black's strong beliefs about the inviolate nature of First Amendment protections. He
is often associated with the phrase (or paraphrase of the First Amendment) that "'no law
means no law."' See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring). In Bridges, the Court held it was unconstitutional for a court to find the petitioner
in contempt for comments published in the newspaper concerning pending litigation. Bridges,
314 U.S. at 274-75. Justice Black framed the issue in terms of "the scope of our national
constitutional policy safeguarding free speech and a free press." Id. at 258.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 95

Professor Langvardt refers to the "increasingly blurry yet technical
constitutional law of defamation."' 18 Consider again the holding of Dun &
Bradstreet that a credit report incorrectly indicating that the plaintiff had
filed bankruptcy was not a matter of public concern. Reflect on that conclusion against a backdrop of the collapse of Enron and more generally of our
debt-ridden society, economy, and government, and our under-funded pension and retirement programs. In light of those considerations, Professor
Langvardt comments that "[o]ne is left to speculate about how a report of a
company's alleged bankruptcy may be of only private concern, but a report
of an individual's alleged sale of obscene material is of public concern." '79
He cautions:
It is inevitable that the essentially standardless Dun & Bradstreet-Hepps
[sic] approach to the public concern question will lead to ad hoc determinations on the constitutionally suspect bases of the relative value or importance of speech. Judges necessarily will consider their own personal notions
of value or importance, and those personal ideas will not always coincide
with those of the public, or even those of other judges. The resulting uncertainty and inconsistency on the public concern question will likely lead to
the chilling of first amendment freedoms. Speakers, uncertain of where the
seemingly arbitrary public concern line will be drawn, may elect to remain
silent out of fear of the consequences ....

180

Finally, the line separating the status and content analyses is illusory.
The question of the existence of a public controversy that is central to
the limited purpose public figure category may mirror, to a significant extent, the matter-of-public-concern question."' 1 Despite the fact that the
Court has occasionally sought to keep the ideas conceptually separate s2
278 Langvardt supra note 27o, at 94.
279 Id. at 131-32.
280 Id. at 127-28.
281 See Smith, supranote Iii, at 1437 (opining that "most lower courts have incorporated a
public or general concern question reminiscent of Rosenbloom [sic] into their limited purpose
public figure analysis by assessing whether or not the cases involve a 'public controversy').
282 See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979) ("A private
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved
in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention."); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. iIi, 135 (1979) (stating that a defendant could not bootstrap plaintiff into becoming a
public figure by dragging him into the national spotlight by the very communication that is
the basis for the lawsuit because "[cllearly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,454 (1976) (rejecting attempts to "equate 'public controversy' with
all controversies of interest to the public").
The Court, in the preceding cases, was addressing voluntary public figures, but a similar
concern was expressed in Wells v. Liddy in the context of involuntary public figures. See Wells
v. Liddy, 186 F3d 505,541 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The touchstone of involuntary public figure status
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and to admonish us that public figure status may not be created by the alleged defamation itself, 83 one wonders on what principled basis the two
ideas-public controversy and matter of public concern-can or should be
separated. They are inextricably intertwined. The public controversy issue
for the purpose of deciding the status question of whether the plaintiff
was a public figure, and the discrete public concern issue recognized in
Dun & Bradstreet overlap and sometimes appear almost interchangeable
despite the Court's profession of their separateness z" The differentiation
of a public controversy and a matter of public concern is a frail, indistinct
dichotomy. We are never sure about what these two concepts mean, or even
whether they mean the same thing. Some post-Dun & Bradstreetcases have
exacerbated the uncertainty with their imprecise use of language to denote "public concern." Consider, for example, some of the terminology of
Justice Brennan (the author of the New York Times opinion). Referring to
the nature of the controversy in the Milkovich case, Brennan wrote oxymoronically that "[t]his was not a private matter of public concern merely to
gossips." ' The Gertz opinion itself uses the phrase "public issue" in place
of controversy at one point. 86 Some state and lower federal court decisions
contain language that facially seems to equate, or use interchangeably,
the ideas of a "public controversy" and "public concern," '8 7 while others

cannot be mere potential public interest.").
283 See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 ("[t]o the extent the subject of his published writings
became a matter of controversy, it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award. Clearly,
those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure."); see also supra note 246.
284 See supra note 246-47 and accompanying text.
285 Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 n.9 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from a denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
286 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (974) ("He plainly did not thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an
attempt to influence its outcome.").
287 See, e.g., Prendeville v. Singer, 155 Fed. Appx. 303, 305 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A limited

purpose public figure is a person who voluntarily injects himself or is thrust into a particularly
public controversy or public concern, and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues." (quoting Gerz, 418 U.S. at 35 1-52)); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867
Ezd 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989) ("An individual is a public figure not through involvement
in mere 'controversies of interest to the public,' but only through participation in 'public
controversies'-i.e., matters of public concern."); Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., No. 95-285M, 1999 WL 813909, at *1, *3 (D.N.H. May 19, 1999) ("Finally, notwithstanding plaintiff's

efforts to narrowly circumscribe the scope of the 'public controversy' into which he thrust
himself, each of the alleged defamatory statements ... relates directly to plaintiff's lobbying
activities, his access to powerful and influential Washington 'insiders,' and his demonstrated
ability to shape public opinion on various issues of public concern."); Schwartz v.Am. Med.
Ass'n, 23 F.Supp. zd 1271, 1274 (D.N.M. 1998) (quoting with approval Furgason v. Clausen,
785 P.2d 242, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3 d 48, 60 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2005) ("In determining whether there is a public controversy, it is vital to ascertain
whether the dispute existed as a public concern prior to the alleged defamatory comments.");
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use language that seems intent on keeping the phrases discrete and sepa28 8
rate.
Neither the concept of public controversy nor the matter of public concern concept is sufficiently predictable to reassure the press, and certainly
not predictable enough to head off a lawsuit or to assuage fear of defamation claims and the litigation costs that such prospects entail. 8 9 As aptly observed, "[iut does little good to provide the media an additional measure of
protection if the media cannot determine when it is being protected."0
Pegasus v. Reno Newspaper, Inc., 57 P.3d 82, 91 (Nev. 2002) ("The test for determining
whether someone is a limited public figure includes examining whether a person's role in
a matter of public concern is voluntary and prominent."); Furgason v. Clausen, 785 P.2d 242,
338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) ("In determining whether appellant is a limited public figure for
defamation purposes, examination focuses on whether the defamatory material concerns a
public controversy or topic of legitimate public concern, together with the nature and extent
of appellant's participation in the controversy.").
The language of commentators also sometimes seems to equate the ideas. See Chadwick,
supra note 121, at iooo-oi. Chadwick proposes "that the determination of whether a
defamatory statement implicates issues of public concern should be explicitly recognized
as the basis for applying first amendment imitations to defamation actions." Id. But, then
he elaborates using the "public controversy" language. Thus, he describes his analysis as
focusing on whether there is "a public controversy involved" and (in almost a status-based
analysis) whether "the plaintiff's involvement in the events giving rise to the controversy
predate the making of the defamatory statement[.]" Id. at 1o59.
288 See, .g.,Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 284 (Utah 2005) (stating
that, "in Hutchinson ... the Supreme Court made clear that a public 'controversy' is a concept
distinct from a 'matter of public concern."'); Krauss v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 674 N.Y.S.zd 662, 664
(A.D. 1998) ("Significantly, in order to be considered a public controversy for this purpose, the
subject matter must be more than simply newsworthy).
289 See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 954-55 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan,
J., dissenting from decision to deny petition for certiorari); Nichols, supra note 92, at 84-85
(stating that as a result of "no clear test" and the "lack of a concrete and workable test," the
"media will have no meaningful standard by which to gauge its conduct."); Taylor, supra note
251, at 153 (stating that "[d]espite pervasive rhetoric professing a deep national commitment
to freedom of expression, the law of defamation has rendered the exercise of this freedom a
hazardous activity"). As Justice Brennan stated:
[Bly allowing damages to be awarded upon a showing of negligence,
thereby diminishing the "breathing space" allowed for free expression
in the New York Times case, the decision in Gertz exacerbated the
likelihood of self-censorship with respect to reports concerning "private
individuals." Consequently, the rules we adopt to determine an
individual's status as "public" or "private" powerfully affect the manner
in which the press decides what to publish and, more importantly, what
not to publish.
Milkovich, 474 U.S. at 954 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
29o Nichols, supra note 92, at 84. Referring in particular to the public concern issue,
Taylor writes:
[Elven assuming that judges will know speech of public concern when
they see it, such a "standard" provides the speaker with no reliable
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Anthony Lewis has written eloquently that "[t]he accommodation of
conflicting interests is always complicated." ' But, perhaps it has been allowed to become too complex. Moreover, the need to decide the status and
content issues under the bipartite test has multiplied the possible permutations. As Don Lewis explains:
[Slince the Court now recognizes both a distinction between private and
public plaintiffs and a distinction between speech not of public concern and
speech of public concern, every defamation case can now be placed in one
of four categories. The number of possible categories had previously been
limited to two. Given the difficulty that courts have had with defamation
cases to this point, one cannot hold too much hope of clearer and more logical results now that the number of categories into which each defamation
case may be placed has been doubled."' 2
Also, an approach that variously depends on the status of the plaintiff
and the content of the communication may create a reciprocal hampering
effect. Attempting to protect the First Amendment with a content-based
prong focusing on the newsworthiness of the communication, and an attempt to uphold the reputation and autonomy of individuals with a statusdriven emphasis on the plaintiff's voluntariness and conscious choice to accept potential scrutiny may skew both and achieve neither. The underlying
interests in freedom of expression and reputation may diverge. And, the
content and status inquiries may not be coterminous. Thus, the pressure to
accommodate one may influence or impinge upon the other.
Over the years, a variety of proposals have emerged to address the uncertainty in the constitutional defamation jurisprudence. Some commentators, for example, have argued in favor of a unitary test to determine the
scope of constitutional limits on defamation. Accordingly, some recommend
using only a status-based test. 93 Others suggest using only a content-based
test. z94 Some would simply apply a constitutional limit to all defamation but
guidelines with which to evaluate his speech prior to publication. Thus,
the very existence of this distinction, from which different degrees of
protection will flow, creates a chilling effect. An author may forgo the
risk of speech altogether for fear of being wrong about the category into
which his speech falls.
Taylor, supra note 251, at 178-79.
291 LEwis, supra note 26, at 244.
292 Lewis, supra note 12, at 782. More generally, K.C. Cole observes in connection with
the nature of entropy, that "the more factors in the equation... the less likely their paths will
coincide in an orderly way." Cole, supra note 3.
293 See Langvardt, supra note 27o, at 128-29 (commenting that "the solution effecting a
vastly more reliable protection of the first amendment interests of speakers is to opt for a set
of fault requirements hinging on the status of the plaintiff-as was the situation after Gertz
[sic] and its constitutional predecessors but before Dun & Bradstreet [sic].").
294 See Chadwick, supra note 121, at iooo-oi (proposing "that the determination of
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set the bar lower than the New York Times "actual malice" requirement. 95
Yet others tinker with the constitutional parameters in other ways, suggesting changes in the various tests, such as "shoring up the multitude of
judicial tests""9 applied to public figures or by explicitly suggesting abolishing the involuntary public figure subcategory in connection with the
status-based analysis. 97 None of these go far enough and sometimes are so
ambivalent and indeterminate that they might actually compound the existing confusion. The sensible response is not to attempt to adopt a single
factor rule-be it status or content-with all its inherent slipperiness. Nor
is it to narrow the First Amendment protection even further by simply redefining the classes of public figures into a mellowy formlessness. It is due
season for a more definitive construct.
98
Freedom of expression is the life breath for the interchange of ideas1
and for an informed citizenry in a free democratic society. Justice Cardozo called it "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom."" 9 One of the cardinal imperatives of a thoughtful
First Amendment jurisprudence is precision 3°° "so that speakers know in
whether a defamatory statement implicates issues of public concern should be explicitly
recognized as the basis for applying first amendment limitations to defamation actions");
supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also Hopkins, supra note 93, at 46. Hopkins
would subsume both limited purpose public figure and involuntary public figures into what
he characterizes as a "Rosenbloom Rule," whereby "all persons who are actively involved in
matters of general or public concern, and who bring libel actions based on discussion of their
involvement in those matters, would be required to prove actual malice .... Id. Hopkins
seems, however, to gravitate toward a dual-focus rule that would to a significant extent depend
on the status of the plaintiff. His proposal would, for example, depend on "the nature and
extent of a libel plaintiff's involvement in a matter of public concern" and "whether the
plaintiff was sufficiently involved with the issue for the actual malice rule to attach," adding
that the "[k]ey to such a determination would be whether the plaintiff assumed an increased
risk of criticism by taking some action." Id. at 47-48.
295 See Taylor, supra note 251, at 183 ("To mitigate the chilling effect associated with a
strict liability standard, negligence should be the minimal level of fault required for a plaintiff
to recover in a defamation action.").
296 Smith, supra note i ii,at 1449-5o (endorsing the Waldbaum analysis if "strictly
construe[d]").
297 See Nichols, supra note 92, at72 (stating that in light of the Court's language "in
Firestone,Hutchinson, and Wolston, the involuntary class should be abolished").
298 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988) (observing that "[alt
the
heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern"); see also Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (discussing the background
of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor in First Amendment jurisprudence, and noting
that "[t]his theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental
interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or solutions
for societal problems").
299 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruledon othergrounds, Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
300 See SMOLLA, supra note 92, §§ 4:59, 4:59 n.1 (stating that "[pirecision is a pervasive
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advance what speech is and is not permitted, thereby avoiding the self-censorship caused by uncertainty." '0 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that "[u]ncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only
dissuade protected speech-the more elusive the standard, the less protection it affords."30 But, despite the candor in those words, the doctrinal
dissolution continues. The absence of predictable and workable guidance
from the Court entails serious costs for those who may be subject to defamation liability and protracted litigation, and to those who must apply the
porous rules.30 3 Extending the New York Times requirements to all defama-

tion claims will help to abate the increasing doctrinal complexity and uncertainty contributing to the corrosion of First Amendment freedoms caused
by the chill of indeterminate defamation litigation.3 4 Eliminating the need
to classify the plaintiff's status or the statement's content thereby promotes
the beneficent interests served by freedom of expression3 5 and its central

theme of modern first amendment analysis," and referring to the "precision principle" as one
of the modern "[F]irst [Almendment constant[s]").
301 Id.§ 4:59. Even those advocating a more contextual, less rule-bound approach to
freedom of speech concede that it is "open to the criticism that it fails to provide the degree of
certainty essential to secure freedom of speech from the chilling effect of perceived regulation
and that it affords unbridled judicial discretion." Trollinger, supra note 40, at 228.
302 Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989).
303 See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND L. REV. 265, 299 (1981) (stating that the "problem of notice can occur because the more

flexibility that the trial court has, the less certain anyone can be in advance of the likely result
in a particular case").
304 I previously explored some of the analysis that follows. See generally King, supra note
39,at 382-86.
305 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5,6-12,47-54 (1989)
(identifying the values protected by freedom of expression, and favoring a model based
on a protected "arena of individual liberty" serving "individuals' self-realization and selfdetermination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims of others"); THOMAS
I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3, 3-15 (1966) (identifying

First Amendment values, including "assuring individual self-fulfillment,... attaining the truth,
... securing participation ...in social, ...[and] political, decision-making, and ... maintaining
the balance between stability and change in the society"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (196o) (stating that the "welfare

of the community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them"); MARTIN
H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A

CRITICAL

ANALYSIS Ii (1984) (saying the guarantee

of free speech serves "'individual self-realization,"' the "only one true value"); Clay Calvert,
The Voyeurism Value in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,17 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 273-

74 (I999) (summarizing reasons for protecting expression under the First Amendment);
Chevigny, supra note 47, at 920 (reasoning that inhibiting freedom of expression may impede
the evolution of language, saying "[a] right to free expression need not be derived, as it has
been traditionally, from ... personal autonomy ... and free trade in ideas, but may also be

rooted in the nature of language itself" and "that the meaning of words is a social matter,
depending on ...a dialogic process among participants" and therefore "society should afford
its citizens a right to participate in the dialogue"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255 (viewing the First Amendment as protecting "the
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role in a free society sustained by the vital interchange of ideas.3"
There is a direct correlation between the doctrinal uncertainty and the
3
"chilling effect"3 7 on freedom of expression. The so-called "fear product""
'
comes in large measure from the specter of potential liability, especially liability imposed inappropriately.3°9 Both the real threat of liability and its
perception are magnified by the imprecision and vagueness of controlling
legal principles.310 Deterrence is a function of the perceived threat as compared to the incentives and benefits of engaging in the subject activity.31'
The threat of over-deterrence is heightened for news publishers because of
market asymmetry due to the inherently short shelf life of the news.31 The
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern"'); Trollinger,
supra note 40, at 139-41, 219 (advocating "[a] free speech theory predicated on a holistic view
of freedom" designed "to promote individual self-affirmation and the full development of
human potential ... through the promotion of wholeness, a wholeness that encompasses the
entirety of each unique individual and of her interconnection with self, others, society, culture,
and history.").
306 The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor for the First Amendment is illustrated by the
words of Justice Holmes nearly a century ago. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that, when individuals realize "that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market"). Some commentators have, however,
rejected the traditional "marketplace of ideas" as the predominant premise for the First
Amendment as too selective and exclusionary in its protections. See Trollinger, supra note

40, at 2o8, 21o.
307 See Lidsky, supra note 40, at 888-91 (examining the chilling effect in the context of
cyberspace); Schauer, supra note 40, at 685 (tracing the phrase in this context to Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
3o8 Schauer, supra note 40, at 696.
309 See id.
310 See id. at 695.

311 See id.at 697.
312 This market asymmetry has been explained this way:
When a newspaper invests in a story, it normally gains only a
relatively small benefit, since the new information is rapidly used by
other publications, too. This has to do with the peculiar economic
properties of information. On the other hand, if the story turns out to
be false and defamatory, the initial publisher may be held liable for the
entire damages, even though it enjoyed only part of the benefits .... In
such a situation, the economically efficient-let alone socially optimalinvestment into news stories would not take place.
EVERETTE

E. DENNIS

& ELI

M.

NOAM,ThiE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS,

x (1987); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

733-34 0998) (stating

that "[i]f a reporter gets a scoop, his newspaper will capture in higher sales revenues only
a part of the value that the public attaches to the news, because the item will be carried in
all competing papers with only slight time lag... [and that tlherefore if the reporter and the
newspaper... are faced with the prospect of large damages, they may be reluctant to publish
the item .... ).
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chilling effect is reified in self-censorship when defamation law discourages communication. 3
The approach suggested by this Article is also responsive to broader
concerns about the increasingly impenetrable legal complexity of the
American civil justice system in general.314 Professor Peter Schuck identi315
fies "indeterminacy" as an important marker of this legal complexity.
Adjudicative consistency is necessary for "advantageous predictability
in the ordering of private conduct. ' 316 Professor Anthony D'Amato explains
that "[liegal certainty decreases over time." 31' He adds that "[riules and
principles of law become more and more uncertain in content and in application because legal systems are biased in favor of unraveling those rules
and principles. 31 I As a result, "lawyers' ability to predict for clients how
their actual or potential cases might be resolved by a court is becoming increasingly uncertain. ' 319 The persistence of this doctrinal entropy and concomitant uncertainty may also be a function of psychological biases of not

313 Lidsky, supra note 40, at 888; Jeffries, supra note z66, at 90 (noting that "limiting
money damages for constitutional violations fosters the development of constitutional law"
and "facilitates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation").
314 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Peter
H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (1992).

According to Schuck, such costs include transaction costs, which he likens to "friction in
mechanics, they are ubiquitous and limit the system's performance," and governance costs. Id.
at 19-2o. Concern about complexity in the American legal system is nothing new. Indeed, the
impetus for the Restatements was the "uncontrolled growth" with concomitant uncertainty
and complexity in American law. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing InstitutionalMemories:
Wisconsin andthe American Law Institute-The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. REV. I, 12-13.
315 Schuck, supranote 314, at 4. Indeterminate rules are "usually open-textured, flexible,
multi-factored, and fluid." Id.
316 Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2039 (1996).
317 Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. I, I(1983).
318 Id. He defines "law" as meaning "not some metaphysical abstraction, but rather what
the law means to the average person: a prediction of official behavioral reaction to what she
plans to do (or avoid doing)." Id.
319 Id. at 3.
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only attorneys32 0 but also of judges3"' and legal commentators, particularly
law professors.3"'
While it may not be possible to eliminate doctrinal uncertainty altogether, one way to mitigate it "is to repeal as many of the rules as possible,"3 3 which D'Amato calls "delegalization. '3 4 This Article's proposal
appropriately mediates these dynamics by scrapping dependence on categorization of the plaintiff's status and the statement's content.
Not only is the current regime too uncertain and unpredictable to serve

32o D'Amato comments:

[Piractitioners of the law have a deep psychological investment in the
assumption that their activities render the law increasingly certain . .
. . [Tihese beliefs are rationalizations ....
[Tihe increasing volume
of litigation and rulemaking results in internal contradictions, a
multiplication of ambiguities, and normative specifications that invite
persons to avoid rules of law by planning their activities around them...
. [T]he sheer volume of reported cases makes it increasingly difficult for
any one court in any one case to consider all relevant precedents ....

...Under information theory, the information value of any given
message increases as the actual message diverges from the predicted
message. Because any lawyer's prediction of official legal reaction to a
client's fact situation is a prediction of the content of the message that
will be received from that official source, a result that contradicts the
informed lawyer's prediction will have higher information value.
Id. at 7, 19.
321 D'Amato opines (albeit somewhat cynically):
Some judges, whether consciously or not, desire status, fame, and
greatness in their profession. Routinely following precedent and always
acting predictably do not often lead to notice and acclaim. There is
little "news value" in decisions that reach completely expected results.
Moreover, by reaching predicted results, the judge adds little or nothing
to the substantive content of the law, and thus the judge loses some
of the gratification that would come from the feeling of "making a
contribution" to the law. Hence, we can reasonably infer, in the aggregate,
a self-interested tendency on the part of the judiciary to maximize
the information value of its services, which can be accomplished by
rendering decisions against the party that was expected to win. Even if
judges do this only a small part of the time, the net effect is still enough
to constitute a force for rendering law increasingly uncertain.

Id. at

19-20.

See id. at 21-22 (saying that "[o]ther things being equal, a professor of law will reap
greater professional rewards by challenging the results of a line of cases or by stating a new
theory than by merely restating the law. For a new theory has information value; a restatement,
by contrast and almost by definition, is not noteworthy.").
323 D'Amato, supra note 317, at 46.
324 Id. at 46.
322
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the First Amendment freedom it espouses, but its subjective methodology for assessing the public-private status of the plaintiff and the public's
concern with the content of the speech invites corrosive value judgments.
Woolly classificatory analyses like the status of the plaintiff and the content of the speech are doubly dangerous because they deceptively reassure judges that they are making the "right" decision. The late Charles
Black believed that mistake and arbitrariness "are reciprocally related."3 '
He wrote that "[a]s a purported 'test' becomes less and less intelligible, and
hence more and more a cloak for arbitrariness, 'mistake' becomes less and
less possible-not.., because of any certainty of one's being right, but for
the exactly contrary reason that there is no 'right' or 'wrong' discernible. 3 6
Similarly, D'Amato claims that "[w]hat is really undesirable about uncertain rules of law is that they leave persons unsure of their entitlements
while affording unfettered discretion to official decisionmakers.11317 Uncer-

tain rules ominously threaten to move our society from one under law "to a
regime of official discretion."3 8 Trollinger has written about the pernicious
implications of the current praxis:
The marketplace mechanism of... discriminating among forms of speech
necessarily requires a political judgment of value. Speech cannot neutrally
be excluded from the First Amendment ambit on the basis of an impartial conclusion that it does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas. All
speech contributes in some manner to the process of market interchange
and competitive discourse. Some speech simply does not contribute in the
manner or of a quality some decisionmaker deems advisable or appropriate

An illusion of neutrality is more destructive of speech freedom and ultimate liberty than overt assumption of responsibility and overt admission
of choice. The pretense can only frustrate aspirations and impede the path
to humanity, aggravating, rather than minimizing and reconciling, the social
differences and inequalities that permeate society.
The neutrality of marketplace theory is, thus, more than illusory. It is affirmatively and selectively destructive of the freedom of the disempowered,
3Z 9
the subordinated, the impoverished, and the socially injured.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan33' has produced a profligacy of conceptual sequelae beset with doctrinal complexity
and uncertainty. The promise of New York Times has faltered almost from
the beginning as the courts sought to define the reach and scope of First
Amendment limitations on state defamation law. In retrospect, it was easy
to understand why in 1964 the Court moved aggressively to stem the litigious threat to freedom of expression at such a crucial time in America's
collective awakening to the scourge of racial injustice. Sadly, the promise of
New York Times-that of assuring a legal climate free of the fear of liability
imposed for expressions made without awareness of their falsity or a conscious indifference to their truth or falsity-has not been realized. New York
Times planted the seeds of a constitutional garden from which ever-growing
layers of doctrinal and decision-making complexity have sprouted.
New York Times heralded a fateful change in American defamation law.
Although traditionally the law of defamation had been (and is still largely)
a product of state law, the legal rules governing defamation since New York
Times have been derived from two sources-state and constitutional principles. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan is celebrated as lifting the
torch of freedom of expression by rescuing it from the "chilling" menace
of defamation lawsuits. Why the promise of New York Times has not been
realized may have many instrumental, conceptual, or transactional answers.
Nevertheless, the reason must rest in large measure on conceptual impediments that have developed in its wake.
The first impediment stems from the courts' uncertainty, ambivalence,
and wavering over the question of the extent to which the First Amendment limitations on defamation claims are determined by a status-driven
test, by a content-based test, or by some sort of composite of the two. The
post-New York Times evolution began with an ostensible commitment to
a status-driven construct under which a plaintiff's burden in defamation
would depend on that plaintiff's status-whether she was a public official
or a private person. The New York Times rule was quickly extended to apply
to public figures. From the beginning, however, the reality of the exclusiveness of a status-based rule for delineating the scope of First Amendment restrictions on defamation has been questionable. Imbedded in the
voluntary public figure analysis is the requirement of an underlying public
controversy, which inevitably calls for an assessment of the content of the
subject matter. Additionally, the possibility of involuntary public figures
requires consideration of content to an even greater extent.
Second, the boundaries and outlines of the public figure classification
have been formless and ill-defined. The hirsute contours of the public fig-

330 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ure-private figure dichotomy have been especially vague for the involuntary public figure subcategory.
Third, the exclusiveness of the plaintiffs status in determining the relevant constitutional rule has given way, at least in some respects, to an
overtly binary matrix. Today, the level of constitutionally mandated limits
on state defamation law depends on two variables: the status of the plaintiff-i.e., whether he was a private person or a public official or figure-and
the content of the communication-i.e., whether it was a matter of private
or public concern.331 Attempting to assess each component individually has
proven frustrating enough, but taken together, the Court's constitutional
bipartite schema has multiplied the uncertainty by increasing the permutations. Uncertainty stems not only from its inherent vagueness and the
Court's ambivalence about the nature and role of status-based rules but
also from doctrinal tension. The latter is a function of the reciprocal hampering effect in applying the often disparate focuses on status and content,
and attempting to harmonize both the status of the plaintiff (driven by
respect for the reputation and autonomy of individuals, with its uneven
emphasis on voluntariness and conscious choice to accept potential scrutiny) and the content of the communication (with its newsworthiness focus
impelled by First Amendment concerns). Tying the standards for defamation to both status and content issues has multiplied the possible permutations, compounding the uncertainty and unpredictability under the bipartite construct. This muddying of the waters is consistent with Professor
D'Amato's observation that legal principles tend to become less, not more,
certain over time, 332 and it is a prime example of doctrinal entropy that engenders uncertainty and difficulty in predicting outcomes.
Finally, defining the scope of the First Amendment safeguards in terms
of status and content is too narrow, confining, and static a paradigm. It
should not matter, for the purposes of the First Amendment, whether on
any given day, a judge happens to deem or not deem a person a public figure. Nor should it matter whether a judge does or does not deem a topic a
matter of public concern.
Rather than continue along a desultory path of trying to reconcile the
dissonant drags of status and content in defining the scope of constitutional limitations on state defamation law, this Article proposes a finished
solution. The Supreme Court should extend the constitutionally mandated
requirement of proof of knowledge or reckless disregard, falsity, and a provably false statement suggesting actual facts to all defamation plaintiffs in all
cases without regard to either the status of the plaintiff or the nature of the
content of the defendant's communication. This proposition has the virtues of certainty, simplicity, and most importantly, affording decisive sup-

331 King, supra note 39, at 379-81.
332 See D'Amato, supra note 317.
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port for the rights of freedom of expression. It is transparent and elegant in
its simplicity. It will, in a single stroke, end the current doctrinal entropy
and offer meaningful reassurance to participants in communication.

